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Abstract 
The Panama Canal has become a constraining factor on trade across the Pacific and 
Atlantic Ocean, and the expansion of the Canal is expected to have a positive 
influence on world trade. Our research investigates the competitiveness of the Panama 
Canal in the container shipping industry and the possible macroeconomic 
consequences of the canal expansion.  
 
We have designed a model that compares costs and earnings for single voyages and 
round-trips, and with a basis in opportunity cost theory we compare the Panama Canal 
with alternative routes and analyze the sensitivity of key variables for different 
scenarios. From our analyses we see that the current bunker price forces vessels to 
slow-steam to maintain profits. This has led shipowners to prioritize cost savings at 
the expense of fewer annual voyages. Simultaneously, operators in the container 
industry are constantly seeking to exploit large-scale advantages and we find strong 
evidence that the unit cost and the size of vessels are inversely proportional. This has 
led to a relentless upsizing of container vessels, and our calculations suggest that the 
expanded Panama Canal will face competition from the Ultra-Large Container Vessel 
segment. Further, our findings suggest that the current Panama Canal toll system with 
a constant price per TEU transited will not be applicable when opening for Post-
Panamax vessels. Therefore, the Panama Canal toll system should be adjusted to 
facilitate for economies of scale in order for the Canal to stay competitive with 
alternative routes. 
 
As the world shipping market is still adjusting after the financial crisis in 2008, the 
expansion comes at an interesting point in time and the possible consequences are 
multidimensional. Our research suggests that the effects can be both positive and 
negative for shipowners depending on whether the expansion leads to an increase in 
tradable volume or a shift in existing trade.  
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1 Introduction 
The Panama Canal connects the Atlantic Ocean with the Pacific, and has been a major 
shipping route over the last 100 years, ensuring trade possibilities between East and 
West. During the last years the Canal has become a constraining factor as the size and 
number of ships have grown exponentially. Shipbuilders have built vessels with 
specifications so accurate that they fit the Canal with a margin of only a few feet, 
pushing the limits for what is possible to bring through the Canal. However, with the 
increasing focus on cost saving, container-shipping companies operates with larger 
ships to exploit economies of scale and seek alternative routes to evade the 
constraining Panama Canal. 
 
In 2006 the government of Panama decided to expand the Canal. The expansion is set 
to finish in December 2015, and there are many uncertainties regarding the impact of 
the expansion on current trade volumes and trade flows. One question is how this will 
affect the competition between the Panama Canal, the Suez Canal and other routes, 
and if the competition will increase on the Asia - U.S. East Coast trade line once the 
Panama Canal is able to accommodate larger vessels. Another interesting aspect is 
what the decisive factors will be when shipowners choose which route to sail. Further, 
the Panama Canal Authority has yet to unveil their new toll system for the expanded 
canal. These are some of the aspects we wish to discuss further in our thesis. 
 
With a basis in opportunity cost theory, we will compare the costs for the different 
route alternatives to assess the competitiveness of the Panama Canal. We will perform 
an analysis based on scenarios before and after the Panama Canal expansion. Further, 
we will look at different round-trip scenarios to identify the consequences related to 
the trade-off between sailing time and voyage cost. Finally, we will discuss the 
sensitivity of key variables and potential macroeconomic effects of the expansion. 
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2 Literature Review 
The proposal for the expansion of the Panama Canal developed by the Panama Canal 
Authority (2006) investigates the possibilities of benefiting from a growing 
commercial and transit demand by expanding the Panama Canal. They project the 
future demand to be both predictable and profitable. They argue that if the Canal were 
not expanded, it would lose competitiveness when reaching its maximum capacity. By 
not being able to capture any additional demand, it would lose its market share in the 
main routes that it serves. Their predictions were that this would lead the Canal to 
gradually lose its position as a key maritime route in world trade. The proposal 
includes a thorough assessment of its competitors, demand opportunities, the 
importance of the expansion and details on what the expansion should comprise.  
 
In 2013, The U.S. Department of Transportation published a Panama Canal expansion 
study with the purpose of identifying the pending developments in world ocean trade 
routes that could possibly affect global and U.S. freight corridors relevant to the 
expansion of the Panama Canal.  The report describes the possible effects of the 
expansion on shipping patterns, industry costs, trade flows and potential markets. It 
thoroughly explains the expansion process and looks at the possible gains from using 
larger ships through the Canal. The main focus of the report is the potential effects on 
U.S. ports and infrastructure. The report proposes that the expansion of the Canal will 
lead to better exploitation of economies of scale, which will lower transportation 
costs. 
 
Notteboom and Rodrigue have produced several research articles on the Panama 
Canal and the expansion, both together and individually. One of their articles, 
Challenges to and challengers of the Suez Canal (2011a) describes the impact of 
bunker prices on the choice of routes. They describe shipping lines as less concerned 
about nautical distances when the bunker price is low. In addition, they compare the 
Suez Canal with the Panama Canal and the Cape of Good Hope. 
In The Panama Canal expansion: business as usual or game-changer? (2011), an 
article from the same series, they discuss changes in trade patterns and the role of the 
Panama Canal toll system in the total cost structure.  
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In an extensive background study made for the Van Horne Institute in 2010, Rodrigue 
assess the impacts of the Panama Canal expansion. The study is called Factors 
impacting the North American freight distribution in view of the Panama Canal 
expansion and focuses on three main classes of factors: Macroeconomic factors, 
operational factors and competitive factors. Rodrigue allege that one of the important 
rationales behind the expansion is related to the improvement of economies of scale in 
maritime shipping.  
 
For a low carbon shipping conference in 2012, Paul Stott did a research on the New 
Panamax and its implications for ship design and efficiency. His research claims that 
the world ship fleet has been constrained in case it has to use the Panama Canal, not 
necessarily because it actually uses it. Thus, vessels have been constructed to fit the 
Panama Canal for the sake of flexibility and re-sale value, even though their owners 
do not trade routes were the Canal is an option. His research further point to the fact 
that container vessels transiting the new locks will be able to carry a capacity of 13 
200 TEU. He also believes that the expansion will lead to economies of scale and 
lower emissions by routing more containers through the Canal. In The Panama Canal 
expansion: business as usual or game changer for ship design? (2012) Stott suggests 
that the expansion will be influential in ship design irrespective of the effects on trade.  
 
In 2012, AECOM prepared a study on Vessel size vs. Cost to explain the advantages 
of shifting to larger ships. Their study is one of the few that actually uses calculations 
to show the scale-advantages of sailing a Post-Panamax vessel through the Panama 
Canal after the expansion. AECOMs calculations take capital costs, fuel costs, 
Panama Canal tolls and labor costs into account when comparing a Panamax vessel 
with larger vessels in an annual round-trip scenario. This is a simplified calculation, 
and the conclusion is that the cost per TEU is lower for the larger vessel.  
 
Common for most previous research is that when they look at the potential effects 
from the expansion, they have a macroeconomic perspective. Few studies have 
compared alternative routes by using models for cost calculations. Similar for most 
conclusions for the impacts of the expansion is that they are vague because of the 
many unknown variables and potential effects. However, there seems to be a 
consensus that the expansion will lead to better exploitation of economies of scale.  
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3 Background 
3.1  The Panama Canal 
Since its opening in 1914 the Panama Canal has established itself as a major passage 
point for world trade with 12 045 oceangoing transits in 20131. This represent roughly 
5 percent of total tonnage traded in the world today (ACP, 2013a). The Panama Canal 
currently serves more than 140 trade routes to over 80 countries. The largest volume 
of trade is on the East - West route, which dominates the container business 
(Stopford, 2009).  
The Canal provides an all-water way passage between the Atlantic and the Pacific 
Oceans – facilitating trade between Asia, Europe, the Caribbean and America. During 
the last decade, the Panama Canal has been outgrown on two essential areas:  
1. The Canal is no longer able to handle the current demand without vessels 
having to spend longer periods waiting to transit 
2. The upsizing of vessels has led to an increasing amount of vessels outgrowing 
the Canal dimensions 
3.1.1 History 
On the 7th of January 1914, when the Canal was still under construction, the French 
crane boat Alexandre La Valley became the first vessel to ever transit the Panama 
Canal. The construction of the Canal was started by the French in 1880 and was 
completed by the U.S. merely 15 years after they acquired control of the project in 
1899. The building project had a total cost of approximately 375 million dollars, 
nearly 300 million cubic meter of mass was removed2 and cost over 25 000 people 
their lives. The project is still seen as one of the greatest engineering achievements 
ever.  
The official opening of the Canal was scheduled for August in 1914, but never took 
place. This was because of the First World War that started on the 28th of July the 
same year. However, the ship SS Ancon became the first ship to officially transit the 
Panama Canal on the 15th of August the same year (ACP, 2014a). 
                                                
1 This includes only oceangoing vessels that are large enough to pay tolls greater than the 
minimum tariffs. 
2 The masses later provided the foundation for the Balboa district in Panama City. 
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3.1.2 Capacity 
The Canal has a total length of nearly 80 kilometer and stretches from the Atlantic 
Ocean to the Pacific Ocean through the Isthmus of Panama. Entering at the Atlantic 
side, vessels first transit through the Gatun Locks. This lifts them 26 meters above sea 
level into the Gatun Lake. After crossing the Gatun Lake, the vessels enter Chagres 
River, which leads to the second and third set of locks, the Pedro Miguel Locks and 
the Miraflores Locks. These take the vessels down to sea level at the Pacific side. The 
dimension of the locks is the constraining factor that has led to the expansion. The 
lock chambers are 33.4 meter wide and 304.8 meter long with varying depth. The 
Pedro Miguel Locks are the shallowest with a depth of 12.9 meter. The air draft is 
restricted to 57.9 meter by the Bridge of the Americas in Balboa. The chamber 
specifics have been used as a basis for the vessel size known as Panamax, 
representing the maximum size of vessels operating in the Canal. A Panamax can 
have a maximum length of 294.1 meter, a beam of 32.3 meter and a draft of 12.04 
meter (ACP, 2013b). 
 
There are many factors that can impact the measured capacity of the Panama Canal, 
such as weather conditions, operating conditions and the size distributions of 
transiting vessels (USDT, 2013). The load capacity for ships transiting the Canal has 
been constantly optimized and the largest Panamax vessels has about four feet of 
clearance on each side when entering the current locks. To avoid accidents vessels 
transiting the Canal must give up control of the bridge to a designated pilot, while 
several tugboats are used to guide the vessel into the locks. 
 
The Panama Canal Authority (also referred to as the ACP) employs the Panama Canal 
Universal Measurement System (PC/UMS) on the various segments using the Canal. 
A 20-feet container (1 TEU) is equivalent to 13 PC/UMS tons, and a tonne of 
PC/UMS is approximately 100 cubic feet of cargo space. Every vessel has a unique 
cargo carrying capacity, which is reflected in a unique PC/UMS-ratio for every 
vessel. This metric is used to calculate transit tolls, and based on these measures the 
current capacity of the Canal is estimated to be more than 300 million PC/UMS tons a 
year (ibid.), or 23 million TEUs if only container vessels were to use the Canal. 
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Since the year of 2001, the PC/UMS capacity has increased with nearly one-third. 
This has been achieved by incorporating several new measures, such as new tie-up 
stations and gradually eliminating nighttime restrictions at the locks. Consequently, 
the maximum capacity for the Canal was almost reached in 2007. Interestingly, the 
increased capacity is not related to an increase in annual transits, but an increase in 
PC/UMS per transits. The expansion project is expected to double the capacity of the 
Canal to 600 million PC/UMS tons (ibid.) even though only 12 - 14 additional vessels 
can be accommodated by the new lock system per day. 
3.1.3 Administration 
The U.S. was the administrator of the Canal since the opening in 1914. After years of 
discussion it was officially returned to the Republic of Panama on the 31st of 
December 1999. The two governments did in fact sign the Panama Canal Treaty in 
1977, including the agreement of a future transfer of the rights of the Canal. The 
treaty also stated that the Canal always would remain open, safe, neutral and 
accessible to vessels from all nations (ACP, 2012a).  
 
The Panama Canal Authority was established on the 27th of December 1997 and has 
the responsibility for operating the Canal as well as forming policies for operations, 
improvement and modernization (ACP, 2012b). After the ACP was given control over 
the Canal they implemented a market-oriented system to replace the former zero-sum 
approach of the U.S. This approach resulted in rising prices and increased 
differentiation, and has led to development and growth in the Republic of Panama. 
For the fiscal year of 2013 the ACP reported 2.4 billion Balboas3 in revenues, 
representing an increase of 0.3 million compared to 2012. From this revenue, the ACP 
will make direct contributions to the National Treasury in the amount of 981.8 million 
Balboas (ACP, 2013a). 
3.1.4 Transit reservation system 
The ACP manages the Canal traffic in a market-oriented sense directing their focus 
towards customer satisfaction and profitability. The customers are offered three 
different options on how to use the transit system:  
 
                                                
3 Balboa is the currency in Panama, along with U.S. dollars, and is pegged against the latter. 
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• Book transits in advance  
• Regular transits without pre-booked time  
• Use a transit booking slot auction system  
 
The auction system was launched as an extra service in 2006 to better the service for 
smaller customers, as advanced bookings favors larger customers in compliance with 
the Customer Ranking used by the ACP4 (ACP, 2014b). 
 
According to the OP Notice to Shipping N-7-2014 (ACP, 2014c) the Canal 
Authorities operates with two general booking periods. The special period is 
designated to commercial passenger vessels and must be booked 547 to 366 days 
prior to the requested transit date. The normal periods are designated to commercial 
vessels and are split into three periods according to how far in advance customers can 
book: 
 
• First period – 362 to 22 days prior to the requested transit date 
• Second period – 21 to 4 days prior to the requested transit date 
• Third period – 3 to 2 days prior to the requested transit date 
 
There are 25 authorized transit slots available per day that will be allocated based on 
booking period and size of vessel as displayed in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: Panama Canal booking slots per period (ACP, 2014c) 
In 2013 the ACP initiated a service called Just-in-Time Service (JIT) in order to 
improve service level and capacity. This allows booked vessels to arrive at the Canal 
                                                
4 Nippon Yusen Kaisha is currently ranked as the ACP´s best customer. 
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closer to the scheduled transit time – thereby reducing their waiting time. This value-
added service allows vessels to stay longer in port and encourage navigation 
according to a fuel-saving practice. A maximum of four JIT booking slots may be 
offered per day to supers, of which two slots will be allocated for each transit 
direction. Similarly, a maximum of two JIT booking slots may be offered to regulars 
each day – one for each direction. At the start of a booking period JIT slots will be 
assigned to vessels that are awarded booking slots during the tie-breaker competition5 
for that period – where the first criteria is customer ranking and the second criteria is 
the order of frequency they have transited over the last twelve months. This 
emphasizes the service offered to the most loyal and profitable customers. After the 
competition the remaining JIT slots will be awarded in the order the requests were 
received.  
 
To operate the Canal efficiently the Canal Authorities depend on transits performed 
according to schedule. As a measure to avoid unnecessary delays they have penalty 
systems for daylight transit cancellation, late arrivals and booking cancellations. To 
avoid a daylight transit cancellation fee, vessels must cancel more than 60 days in 
advance. In addition, a booking cancellation fee will always be included. At page 15 
in the notice (ibid.) it is stated that vessels scheduled to arrive at 14:00 that arrive 
between 14:01 and 15:00 must pay 50 percent of the booking fee as a late arrival fee. 
The penalty fee increases each hour until it reaches a maximum of three hours and a 
penalty fee equivalent to 200 percent of the booking fee. This is to ensure maximum 
on-schedule transits.  
3.1.5 Key figures 
According to the latest annual report from the ACP (2013a), the Panama Canal ended 
its last fiscal year with 320.6 million PC/UMS tons transited. This represents a 
decrease of 13.1 million tons compared to 2012 and can be related to a decrease in 
demand due to changes in the maritime industry.  
 
During fiscal year 2013 the full container vessel segment recorded 3 103 transits, 
representing 117.6 million PC/UMS or 12.1 million TEUs. This represents a 6.8 
                                                
5 A tiebreak competition is a competition where one uses different criteria to determine who is 
the winner when it is a tie. In our example this is how to allocate slots when several vessels 
has requested slots during a period. 
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percent decrease in total transits, 1.9 percent measured in PC/UMS and 0.8 percent 
measured in TEU compared to 2012. The reason for the rather significant difference 
in total transits compared to PC/UMS and TEUs is an increase in average vessel size 
from 3 659 TEU in 2012 to 3 895 in 2013.  
Revenues from the container vessel segment accounted for 51.5 percent of the overall 
Canal toll income for fiscal year 2013. 
 
In the report we find that The Canal Waters Time (CWT), which is the total time 
elapsed from the vessel arrives at the Canal plus the actual transit time, registered an 
average of 24.5 hours in fiscal year 2013 - a reduction of 4.53 percent compared to 
the 25.66 hour average in fiscal year 2012. First of all, this is a result of a reduction in 
the daily average of vessels waiting in queue – a decrease of 15.21 percent from 46 
vessels in fiscal year 2012 to 39 in 2013. Secondly, the CWT is lower due to a 
reduction in booked vessels, which has decreased by 12.14 percent from 5 768 vessels 
in fiscal year 2012 to 5 068 in 2013. Finally, it is a result of a decrease in the quantity 
of vessels that were affected by fog – from 417 vessels in 2012 to 307 in 2013. 
 
The average CWT for booked vessels in fiscal year 2012 was 14.86 hours compared 
to 14.36 hours in fiscal year 2013, representing a 0.5-hour decrease. On the other 
hand, the CWT average for non-booked vessels was down by 2.55 hours in 2013 to an 
average of 31.95 hours from 34.5 hours the latter fiscal year. According to ACP 
(2013a) this represents an important reduction. 
 
Further we find that the In-Transit-Time (ITT), which is the elapsed time from the 
vessel arrives to the first lock until it exits the last one, registered an average of 10.78 
hours in fiscal year 2013 – a 0.08 percent increase from a 10.7 hour average in 2012. 
This was slightly affected by a 152-hour programmed maintenance increase, 
performed during lane outages in the Gatun, Pedro Miguel and Miraflores Locks, 
which were 435 hours in 2013, compared to 283 hours in 2012. 
 
As for the financial indicators, they present robust and solid levels. 50 cents of net 
profit was generated for each balboa of income. This 50 percent profit margin 
highlights the wealth capacity of the Panama Canal. The ability to deliver such results 
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while substantial capital investments are being made underlines its robustness. The 
revenue stream stems from three sources:  
 
• Toll revenues  
• Transit related services   
• Other revenues  
 
For fiscal year 2013 the allocation of revenues were 1.85 billion balboas from tolls, 
374 million from transit related services and 187 million from unspecified sources – 
making tolls the largest income source representing almost 77 percent of the total 
revenue. Total operating expenses amounted to 733.8 million balboas and represented 
30.4 percent of the total income. Personal services accounted for 59 percent of the 
expenses. 
3.2  The expansion plan 
In their expansion proposal from 2006, the ACP lists four main objectives for the 
expansion (ACP, 2006): 
 
• Achieve long-term sustainability and growth for the Canals contributions to 
Panamanian society through the payments it makes to the National Treasury 
• Maintain the Canals competitiveness as well as the value added by Panama’s 
maritime route to the national economy 
• Increase the Canals capacity to capture the growing tonnage demand with the 
appropriate levels of service for each market segment 
• Make the Canal more productive, safe and efficient 
 
The expansion project is referred to as the third set of locks project and contains a 
series of projects: 
 
• Both the Canal entrance at the Atlantic and the Pacific side must be deepened 
and widened 
• The operating water level in the Gatun Lake must be raised in order to 
accommodate larger vessels 
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• The navigation channel must be widened and deepened in both the Gatun 
Lake and the Culebra Cut 
• Four dry excavation projects will be executed in order to connect the Pacific 
locks and the Culebra Cut with a new 6.1 kilometer long access channel 
• Build a new access channel on the Atlantic side 
 
The two new locks that are under construction on each side of the Gatun Lake will 
have three consecutive chambers designed to move vessels from sea level to the level 
of the Gatun Lake and back down again. The new lock chambers will have a length of 
427 meter, a width of 55 meter and a depth of 18.3 meter. The locks will be able to 
accommodate vessels that are 366 meters long, with a 49-meter beam and a draft of 
15.2 meter. The air draft will still be constrained to 57.9 meter because of the Bridge 
of the Americas. 
3.2.1 Project progress 
About 70 percent of the expansion work is already finished, but a dispute that began 
on the 1st of January 2014 put the project in danger. After postponing the initially 
planned opening from 2014 to 2015, the dispute put even the rescheduled opening in 
danger. The dispute was related to cost overruns of approximately $ 1.6 billion, and 
Grupo Unidos por el Canal (GUPC), the consortium that won the multi-billion dollar 
deal, threatened to halt the construction unless ACP agreed to cover half the overrun. 
ACP on their side accused the consortium for breaching contract obligations. The 
consortium, led by the Spanish construction company Sacyr, won the contract with a 
bid that was $ 1 billion lower than the next lowest bidder. The current Canal 
Administrator blames the former administrator for accepting an unrealistic low bid. 
On the 7th of February 2014, five years after GUPC won the $ 3.1 billion contract-bid 
they suspended work and 10 000 jobs were at risk. On the 20th of February, after 13 
days of total stop in construction, a temporary agreement was reached to start the 
work again. Given the size of the project, its impact on maritime trade and the 
significant cost overruns, governments in Europe and the U.S. has been involved in an 
attempt to find a solution. The ACP made it clear that they would cancel the 
agreement if a solution were not found. To make matters even more complex, the 
project has been considered a lifeline for Sacyr after contracts dried up in the 
aftermath of the Euro debt crisis. The project also has direct implications for the 
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Spanish government who provided a financial guarantee to the insurer of the project 
(New York Times, 2014).  
On the 27th of February 2014 the ACP published a press release stating that they had 
reached a conceptual agreement with the consortium. The agreement was signed on 
the 14th of March and states that the opening of the Canal will be further delayed 6 
months until December 2015. The price of the contract remains the same and the 
consortium did not achieve successful payment claims. Both the ACP and GUPC will 
pay $ 100 million to ensure the immediate continuation of the project. GUPC has 
arranged for $ 400 million in further financing through performance bonds, which can 
only be released by the Zürich lender (ACP, 2014d).  
3.2.2 Vessel capacity 
The size specifications of the new locks are set, but there seems to be some 
disagreements on how much capacity the new locks actually will be able to 
accommodate.  
 
Today only 2.5 percent of the world seaborne trade passes through the Canal. 
However, approximately 25 percent of the deep-sea commercial fleet has a Panamax 
beam, representing approximately 8 500 vessels in total (Stott, 2012). The flexibility 
of the Panamax vessel is one of the reasons why it is preferred. Less flexibility for the 
shipowner is equivalent with higher risk and is directly reflected in the re-sale value 
of the ship. Stott argues that this has led the Canal to become a constraining factor 
because of the possibility that a ship might use it at one point, not because it actually 
uses it.  
According to the ACP`s predictions (2006) the size of the largest container ship that 
will be able to transit the Canal laden will increase from around 4 800 TEU (this is 
now more than 5 000 TEU) to around 12 000 TEU after the expansion. In his 
research, Stott (2012) suggests that the Maersk Edison is a vessel that would fit the 
new dimensions. The Maersk Edison has a capacity of approximately 13 100 TEU, 
with a scantling draft of 15.5 meter and design draft of 14.5 meter. The scantling draft 
is the deepest draft the strength of the hull can safely bear, whereas the design draft is 
the optimal draft the ship was designed to operate with. Stott further used AIS data for 
a sample of 39 container ships with a 15.5-meter scantling draft – where only two 
vessels indicated an operating draft of more than 15.2 meter, which is the new 
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constraint. In his study, the mean draft was 13.5 meter with a median of 13.2 meter. 
This indicates that Post-Panamax ships with a capacity up to 13 200 TEU will be able 
to make the transit, with the length of the vessel being the constraining factor rather 
than the draft.  
 
During the five years prior to the announced expansion plan the largest existing ship 
was constant at a 9 600 TEU capacity. However, over the next five years the size of 
ships dramatically increased with the introduction of Ultra-Large Container Vessels 
(ULCV) with a capacity of 15 500 TEU (ibid.) – represented by the Emma Maersk. In 
2013 Maersk introduced a new class of container ships, the Triple-E class. With a 
capacity of more than 18 000 TEU it represents the largest container vessels ever 
built. After Maersk ordered 20 Triple-E vessels in 2011 it is a fair assessment that 
these ships will be a major player on long-haul routes. According to the Container 
Orderbook the Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), the China Shipping 
Container Lines (CSCL) and the United Arab Shipping Company (UASC) are also 
looking to add Triple-E ships to their fleet (Clarkson SIN, 2014).  
 
Dry-bulk Capesize vessels of 180 000 DWT (deadweight tonnage6) are within the 
constraint considering length and beam, but the draft is too deep when laden (Stott, 
2012). They will, however, be able to transit the Panama Canal in ballast. The largest 
laden dry-bulk carrier that will be able to transit will be approximately 120 000 DWT. 
New Handysize (Supramax) and 85 000 DWT designs will benefit from the increase 
in beam, as designers will be able to optimize hull designs without the beam 
constraints. Regarding tankers, the Suezmax will be able to transit the new canal in 
ballast or partly laden. The largest fully loaded standard tanker that is certain to fit is 
an Aframax of approximately 120 000 DWT.  
3.3 Container shipping 
“There has to be a better way of loading cargo aboard ship piece by piece.” – 
Malcolm McLean, 1937. 
 
                                                
6 Deadweight tonnage is a measure of how much weight a ship is carrying or can safely carry. 
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Looking back more than 70 years ago, a small trucking firm-owner by the name of 
Malcolm McLean was beginning to grow tired of the time-consuming and labor-
intensive process of loading his cargo, in this case cotton, from trucks aboard ships 
heading for Istanbul. He was determined there would be a way of making the loading 
process more efficient. Why couldn’t an entire truck be hoisted aboard ship? He 
asked. Two decades later, in 1956, he did something about it. The result was a 
redesigned World War II tanker named Ideal X, with a reinforced deck carrying 58 
metal container boxes as well as 15 000 tons of bulk petroleum from Port Newark to 
Houston. This would later be referred to as the first successful containership, and 
revolutionized the world of intermodal freight transport (Cudahy, 2006).  
 
Intermodal freight transport combines multiple modes of transport such as rail, ship 
and truck in the transport of goods without directly handling the freight itself when 
changing modes.  This has later become an important part of the definition of 
containerization, which is a system of intermodal freight transport using standardized 
containers. This system has improved the efficiency of freight transport by allowing 
the goods to be transported between modes with a minimum of interruption and by 
avoiding the risk of damaging the goods. It has also been an important step towards 
exploiting economies of scale in the vessels (Strandenes, 2012). 
 
Containers have become standardized to twenty-foot (TEU), forty-foot (FEU) and 
forty-five-foot containers, with a majority of 75 percent being 40 feet. These are 
known as intermodal containers as they are designed in such a way that they can be 
easily moved between different modes of transport. The containers are equipped with 
a simple twist lock fitting system to make them easier to handle when craning, 
stacking and locking.  
 
A TEU is short for Twenty-Foot Equivalent Unit and is based on the volume of a 
twenty-foot container, which is twenty feet long and eight feet wide. The height is not 
standardized and can vary from 4.25 feet to 9.5 feet. However, the most common 
height is 8.5 feet. The Twenty-foot equivalent unit has become a standardized 
measurement and is widely used when defining container ship capacity.  
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3.3.1 Container ships  
The container fleet currently consists of ships ranging in capacity from 100 TEU to 
over 18 000 TEU (Clarkson SIN, 2014). The ships in the lowest capacity range are so-
called Feeders and Handy (Sub-Panamax) container vessels. They tend to be used on 
short-haul operations (also called “feeder”-operations) carrying coastal traffic to and 
from transshipment ports or for direct short sea services (USDT, 2013). Feeder 
vessels have a capacity between 100 - 1 000 TEU, while Handy vessels have a 
capacity between 1 000 - 3 000 TEU. Next we find ships specially designed to fit the 
Panama Canal called Panamax vessels, which usually have a capacity between 3 000 - 
5 000 TEU (The largest Panamax vessel in the register have a capacity of 5 117 
TEU). Further up on the capacity range we find Post-Panamax (or New-Panamax) 
vessels. These ships usually have a capacity ranging from 5 000 - 18 000 TEU. 
However, we find Post-Panamax vessels with a capacity down to 3 500 TEU. These 
vessels are classified as Post-Panamax vessels due to their size specifications rather 
than their TEU capacity. In addition, ships above 14 000 TEU are also categorized as 
Ultra-Large Container Vessels (ULCV). The current largest Post-Panamax vessels 
have a capacity of 18 270 TEU. Panamax and Post-Panamax vessels are mostly used 
for long-haul, intercontinental deep-sea routes.  
3.3.2 Containership fleet size 
According to Clarksons Container Intelligence Quarterly (2013) operators continue in 
their quest for economies of scale. This is demonstrated by relentless vessel upsizing. 
There have been insinuations that this may potentially be encouraged by the 
expansion of the Panama Canal. Following, a study by the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (2013) shows that the worldwide fleet of container ships is projected 
to grow in TEU capacity by 30 percent from the end of 2011 to the end of 20157. 
However, it is worth mentioning that even with the industry pursuing economies of 
scale in the ultra-large sectors, the 5 000 - 10 000 TEU sectors have grown 
significantly (Stott, 2012).  
Container ships is currently the largest and fastest growing market segment for the 
Panama Canal (USDT, 2013) and as of February 2014 the world containership fleet 
consisted of a total of 5 114 vessels. According to the containership orderbook the 
                                                
7 Based on current orders for new ships and does not count for any scrapping of older ships. 
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number of vessels is expected to grow with a total of 22 percent within 2015 
(Clarkson SIN, 2014). An overview of the current fleet and its expected growth is 
presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Container fleet and orderbook overview (Clarkson SIN, 2014) 
Figure 1 shows that a large amount of new ships are in the range of 10 000 TEU and 
greater.  This is a reflection of the rapidly changing composition of the global 
containership fleet, with an emphasis on larger, more fuel-efficient ships (USDT, 
2013).  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3.2.2, the new Panama Canal Locks will be restricted to 
handle ships up to approximately 13 200 TEU. We can therefore observe that an 
increasing percentage of the world’s containership fleet still will not be able to transit 
through the Panama Canal after its expansion. It is expected that these larger ships 
will be engaged in Europe - Asia trade via the Suez Canal or the trans-Pacific routes, 
and there is a likelihood that they eventually will engage in direct U.S. East Coast 
trade via the Suez Canal (USDT, 2013).  
3.3.3 Current challenges 
“The economics are much, much better via the Suez Canal simply because you have 
half the number of ships”  - Søren Skou, CEO Maersk Line (2013) 
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According to Bloomberg (2013a), the world´s biggest container shipping company, 
Maersk Line, has threatened to stop using the Panama Canal to transport their cargo 
from Asia to the U.S. East Coast. With an increasing fleet of larger vessels, Maersk 
will be able to move their cargo more profitably through the Suez Canal. With Maersk 
being one of the Panama Canals largest customers, one might also wonder if this 
threat is a stunt to force the ACP to lower the future canal tolls when the expanded 
canal is finished. Following, some of the reasons for the global shipping shift are not 
only results of the size constraining Panama Canal, but also a result of the increasing 
costs of transit and waiting times for entering the locks. Companies have also shown 
their concerns regarding the limited number of U.S. East Coast ports that can service 
Post-Panamax ships.  
3.4 Alternative routes 
Since its birth, the Panama Canal has connected the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, 
providing the shortest maritime route option between Northeast Asia and the U.S. 
East Coast. However, due to its capacity constriction, other alternative routes have 
become competitive solutions for trade across the two oceans. In the following section 
we will present the routes that we believe are viable alternatives to the route passing 
through the Panama Canal, and that might be affected by the expansion.  
3.4.1 The Suez Canal 
The Suez Canal is often considered to be the most obvious competitor to the Panama 
Canal. The Suez Canal is an artificial waterway running north to south across the 
Isthmus of Suez in Egypt, connecting the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea. This is 
a sea-level canal and is therefore the world’s longest canal without locks, making it a 
more efficient and attractive pathway for larger ships. It provides the shortest route 
between Europe and South-Asia, and has become a viable route alternative for vessels 
traveling from the U.S. East Coast to Northeast Asia. Most of the Suez Canal is 
limited to a single lane of traffic, but the Canal has four doubled zones with six 
bypasses located along the way. This allows for transit of ships in both directions 
(SCA, 2014a). Vessels are able to transit the Canal both during the day and night with 
an average transit time between 12 - 16 hours. Vessels must arrive at a designated 
waiting area outside the Canal entrance 5 hours before the convoy sails. Vessels are 
able to arrive closer to the convoy start if they pay a penalty fee. 16 596 vessels 
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transited the Canal in 2013, of which 36 percent were container vessels. The 
navigation is run as a convoy system, with three convoys daily: 
 
1. Southbound from Port Said at 00:00 hours 
2. Northbound from Port Tawfiq at 06:00 hours 
3. Southbound from Port Said at 06:30 hours 
 
The Suez Canal has the advantage of allowing carriers to use Post-Panamax vessels. 
This gives the shipowner the possibility to increase his revenue due to a higher 
productivity per Post-Panamax vessel, even if the operational costs of using more 
ships through the Suez Canal may be greater (ACP, 2006). In 2006, the ACP made a 
simple comparison between the two route alternatives based on TEU capacity as a 
part of their expansion proposal. The results are presented in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Route comparison (ACP, 2006) 
According to their calculations, a weekly containership liner service 8  between 
Northeast Asia and the U.S. East Coast requires eight ships rotating to cover all port 
calls and sailing times without interruptions. Based on the comparison in Figure 2 we 
can see that the current annual service capacity for carriers using eleven 8 000 TEU 
Post-Panamax vessels through the Suez Canal is much higher (417 143 TEU) than the 
capacity for carriers using eight 4 800 TEU Panamax vessels through the Panama 
Canal. However, Figure 2 also shows that the same service capacity of 417 143 TEU 
can be delivered through the expanded Panama Canal with the use of only eight 
vessels rather than eleven through the Suez Canal. As this comparison was made in 
2006, it lacks some relevance with regards to the ship sizes used. With todays 
information available, we know that the new Panama Canal will be able to handle 
ships with a 13 200 TEU capacity. We also know that ships with a capacity of 
                                                
8 A containership liner service transits regular routes on fixed schedules.  
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approximately 18 000 TEU are sailing through the Suez Canal. Therefore, we have 
updated the numbers used in the ACP comparison, to make it more realistic. 
 
 
Figure 3: Updated route comparison 
In Figure 3 we use a ship with the new maximum capacity for the expanded Panama 
Canal, we updated the current Panama Canal ship size to 5 117 TEU by using the 
biggest ship currently able to transit the Canal, and finally we added a vessel carrying 
the maximum capacity able to transit through the Suez Canal. By using a ship with a 
13 200 TEU capacity, the same service capacity can be delivered through the 
expanded Panama Canal with the use of only eight vessels rather than eleven through 
the Suez Canal. On the other hand, a ship with a 18 000 TEU capacity can deliver a 
much larger service capacity running through the Suez Canal, even if a ship this size 
will have a slightly lower annual productivity than a 13 200 TEU-ship running 
through the Panama Canal.  
As this comparison excludes several important details, it is not accurate. It does, 
however, indicate that the expansion of the Panama Canal may increase its 
attractiveness once again for shipowners carrying cargo to and from the U.S. East 
Coast to Northeast Asia.  
3.4.2 Cape Horn (Magellan Strait) 
The route through the Magellan Strait and the route around Cape Horn are the two 
alternatives rounding the southern tip of South America. Historically the route around 
Cape Horn has been an important path for trade and passenger ships taking goods and 
people from the U.S. East Coast to the U.S. West Coast (GlobalSecurity, 2014). It has 
been feared for its notorious weather conditions with sailing hazards such as strong 
winds, large waves and icebergs drifting up from Antarctica. With todays bigger, 
powered vessels, better navigation equipment and weather knowledge, Cape Horn is 
less feared than it used to be, but the weather is still the same. This taken into 
consideration, in addition to the large sailing distance compared to the Panama Canal, 
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makes this a less attractive alternative. It is however without capacity constraints, 
allowing for the use of larger ships and possible advantages from economies of scale. 
3.4.3 Cape of Good Hope 
Located at the southern tip of South Africa, the Cape of Good Hope route represent an 
alternative when sailing from Asia to U.S. East Coast. The route around Good Hope 
also facilitates trade between Asia and South America, Asia and West Africa and 
South America and East Africa (Notteboom & Rodrigue, 2011a). The route had an 
upturn in traffic in 2008 when the piracy activity outside the coast of Somalia 
increased9. The weather conditions are similar as those for the Cape Horn route, 
presenting a challenging sailing environment.  
3.4.4 The U.S. Intermodal System 
The U.S. Intermodal System offers an alternative to the all-water route from Asia to 
the U.S. East Coast by providing a land-based extension of the transpacific route. This 
allows for companies to ship their cargo from Asia to the U.S. West Coast and further 
to the destination by land-based transportation modes such as trains or trucks. The 
U.S. Intermodal System has proved to be a viable solution to the all-water route much 
due to the fact that it can make use of Post-Panamax vessels for the sea-transport 
between Asia and the U.S. West Coast. 
The U.S. Intermodal System connects the U.S. West Coast ports with the main 
consumption centers in the U.S. by railroads and the transcontinental road system. 
This system is not an integrated operational unit, which has been pointed out as one of 
its main challenges due to the many bottlenecks that form (USDA, 2010). The U.S. 
Intermodal System relies on a large number of commercial operators such as port 
operators, transshipment area operators and railroad and trucking companies. The 
increase in transpacific trade has had an overwhelming effect on the system capacity. 
This has led to congestion and labor conflicts, which affects the reliability of the route 
compared to the more stable and reliable Panama Canal route (ACP, 2006). Due to 
the many commercial operators, the intermodal land-based route is more costly than 
                                                
9 The number of reported attacks near Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden increased from only 
10 in 2006 to 111 in 2008 (Notteboom & Rodrigue, 2011a). 
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the Panama Canal route. On the other hand, it offers a higher variability in service 
dependability, and may be less time-consuming depending on the cargo destination. 
Through the last decade, there has been a growth in the Panama Canal market share 
on the Northeast Asia - U.S. East Coast trade route, with a similar reduction in the 
U.S. intermodal market share. This can be related to several factors such as reduced 
transit times in the Canal, congestion problems in the intermodal system, and an 
increase in distribution centers located closer to the U.S. East Coast (ibid.). The 
United States Department of Agriculture (2010) believes that the Canal expansion 
will increase the efficiency of the U.S. Intermodal System by decongesting the West 
Coast main ports such as the Port of Los Angeles. They also claim that large 
investments in U.S. infrastructure and a more integrated approach will be necessary 
for the U.S. Intermodal System to remain competitive to the Panama Canal after the 
expansion. 
An expected consequence of the Panama Canal expansion is that it will increase 
aggregated volumes, directly effecting both inland rail and highways. Increased 
unloads from larger, but fewer ship calls, would result in volume spikes and rising 
demand in landside connections.  
 
When shipowners consider using the intermodal alternative there is a variety of 
concerns to address. These concerns may include port and terminal access, road 
congestion, environmental issues and government regulations on local, regional, state 
or federal level. These variables are not directly related to the Panama Canal 
expansion but will influence the total incremental cost of transportation and thereby 
indirectly affect the Panama Canal and the impact of the expansion.  
3.4.4.1  U.S. West Coast 
According to U.S. Census Bureau data, U.S. West Coast ports handle most 
containerized U.S. imports – approximately 69 percent of 2010 and 2011 total U.S. 
tonnage (USDT, 2013). Southern California (Los Angeles, Long Beach and San 
Diego) is the largest gateway region for moving goods into the United States, 
followed by Pacific Northwest (Seattle, Tacoma and Portland), while Canadian and 
Mexican ports have relatively small shares. These ports serve both local markets and 
act as a gateway to inland U.S. regions, moving goods by one of three means: 
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• By North American rail intermodal services provided by the West Coast Class 
1 railroads 
• By truck to inland destinations 
• By truck to trans-load centers where the contents are repacked from 40-foot 
international containers into 53-foot domestic containers for more efficient 
transport to inland locations 
 
 
The escalation of container carriage has increased train size as well as vessel size. 
Until 1990 there were only 100 double-stack trains moving East - West to and from 
California, whereas today more than 3 000 double-stack trains move weekly in all 
directions from both maritime gateways and domestic intermodal facilities (USDT, 
2013). A double-stack container unit train has typically had a length ranging from 6 
000 to 7 500 feet, being able to carry from 200 to 250 containers. On high-volume 
routes such as Los Angeles - Chicago, trains range from 10 000 up to 12 000 feet and 
a container capacity of 325 to 400 has been introduced in later years. Train companies 
are also experimenting with prototype trains of about 18 000 feet with a 600 container 
capacity. These larger unit trains offer lower unit cost per container when moving 
inlands and could enable West Coast ports to better compete for cargo that otherwise 
would be destined to travel through the expanded Panama Canal.  
Figure 4: Inland and all-water transportation time (USDT, 2013) 
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3.4.4.2  Trucking 
Trucking is an essential part of the U.S. Intermodal System – carrying in excess of 70 
percent of total U.S. cargo tons imported through West Coast ports. There are few 
substitutes, no matter the cost or how congested local highways and bridges may be – 
making trucking the primary mode of transportation when serving markets close to 
ports. For some intermediary distances long-haul trucking could compete with rail, 
especially when intermodal nodes are far from the origin, requiring additional local 
trucking. However, on longer distances rail becomes the preferred alternative (USDT, 
2013). 
3.4.5 Other alternatives 
In a long-term perspective, new trading routes may emerge. These will not propose an 
immediate threat to the Panama Canal, but we will give a short introduction to some 
of the potential routes.  
 
In Nicaragua, one of Panama´s neighbor countries in Central America, there have 
existed plans to build a canal connecting the Atlantic and Pacific for more than 150 
years. These have presumably gathered pace the last years. In 2013, the Nicaraguan 
Congress gave a 50-year concession to the HK Nicaragua Canal Development 
Investment Company, a Beijing-based entrepreneur (New York Times, 2013). Experts 
question the realism of the project, partly due to a lack of location details in the 
concession. In addition, the government lacks support from the public, there are 
several environmental issues and the existing Panama Canal makes economists 
question the basis for future cash flow. On the other side, the leader of the HKND-
group, Wang Jing, claims that the project has investors and that the work will start in 
2014 – taking 6 years to finish (Bloomberg, 2013b). 
 
Due to changes in the climate, shipowners are investigating the possibility to sail both 
the Northwest Passage and the North Sea Route (also known as the Northeast 
Passage), and there has been an increase in traffic through these passages each year. 
The arctic routes enjoy shorter distances and sailing time from both the U.S. and 
Europe to most of Asia compared to the other route alternatives, but are prone to 
harsh weather and ice, making them both risky and un-assessable parts of the year. 
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Estimates on when these routes could become more accessible linger from 20 - 50 
years. 
3.5  Ports 
According to U.S. Census Bureau data, U.S. ports handled 99 percent of the overseas 
U.S. trade, whereas just 1 percent was transported by air (USDT, 2013). The 
expansion of the Panama Canal will have a great impact on ports around the 
American continent. As many ports do not have the necessary means to serve vessels 
of Post-Panamax size, they face the dilemma of either expanding or hoping that the 
traffic of Panamax size vessels are enough to stay operative and remain profitable. 
Factors that could represent both opportunities and problems are:  
 
• The navigability of the ports (water draft)  
• Air draft restrictions  
• Terminal capacity 
• Landside connectivity 
 
As the largest fully laden Post-Panamax requires 47.6 feet of draft without tidal 
restrictions, it is safe to assume that ports that want to be able to accommodate these 
ships must have channels, water depths and berths with a depth of 50 feet.  This is not 
a problem at the U.S. West Coast where the most trafficked ports such as Los 
Angeles, Long Beach, Oakland, Seattle, Tacoma, Vancouver and Prince Rupert are all 
deep-water container ports. On the U.S. East Coast only two ports, Baltimore and 
Norfolk, have sufficient water depth. However, by the time the new Panama Canal 
opens, the Port of Miami, Fort Lauderdale and New York/New Jersey will have been 
dredged and expanded to accommodate Post-Panamax vessels.  
3.5.1 New York 
The port of New York/New Jersey (NY/NJ) has a water depth of 50 feet in parts of its 
harbor and the dredging to accommodate larger vessels will be completed in 2014 
(Port of New York and New Jersey, 2014).  
A project that will not finish before the opening of the new Panama Canal is the 
raising of the Bayonne Bridge. The bridge limits access to four of the five container 
terminals and can therefore be considered restraining for larger vessels. With a height 
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clearance of less than 151 feet, it limits the possibility for the largest Post-Panamax 
vessels to use these terminals. The $ 1.3 billion project was approved in 2013 and is 
planned to finish in 2017. This will raise the deck with 64 feet – allowing Post-
Panamax vessels to access the entire port.  
The Global Marine Terminal is located in front of the entrance to the Kill Van Kull 
Strait and ships calling this terminal will not have to transit beneath the Bayonne 
Bridge. This terminal can therefore handle Post-Panamax vessels arriving from the 
new Panama Canal, as well as from the East through the Suez Canal without being 
constrained by the height specifics of the vessels. The Global Marine Terminal is 
scheduled to open a new expanded terminal this year, offering a capacity of 1.7 
million TEUs per year. In addition, they have the possibility to enlarge the Newark 
Container Terminal and to add an adjacent berth to the New York Container Terminal 
on Staten Island (ibid.).  
 
As one of the most trafficked ports in the U.S. the Port of NY/NJ had a container flow 
of 5 529 909 TEUs in 2012, accounting for both import and export. The share 
between imports and exports is quite evenly distributed with 2 817 805 TEUs 
imported and 2 712 104 exported (PANYNJ, 2012). 
3.5.2 Los Angeles 
The Port of Los Angeles is located at the San Pedro Bay in Los Angeles. The port has 
sufficient water depth to accommodate Post-Panamax vessels – and is assessed in our 
research as part of the intermodal route alternative. It is the number one port in the 
United States measured both in container value and volume, and has held this position 
since year 2000 (Port of Los Angeles, 2014a). The Port handled 8.5 million TEUs in 
the record year of 2006, while they in 2013 handled 7.9 million TEUs (ibid.). In 2011 
the containerized cargo was valued at $ 234.3 million (Import: 200.7, Export: 33.6) 
(USDT, 2013). Imported containerized cargo accounts for almost 86 percent of the 
total value, as containerized import significantly outgrows exports in most U.S. ports. 
China is the number one trade partner and had a port market share of nearly 40 
percent in 2012 (WC, 2013).  
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3.5.3 Hong Kong 
In 2012 the Port of Hong Kong handled 23.1 million TEU and is therefore one of the 
most trafficked and efficient international container ports in the world (PHK, 2012). 
410 container liner services have calls every week connecting about 520 destinations 
worldwide. The Kwai Chung-Tsing Yi container terminal handled 17.5 million TEUs 
in 2012, representing 76 percent of the total amount of containers handled by the port. 
Its total handling capacity is approximately 20 million TEUs. The port of Hong Kong 
has a total of nine terminals handled by five different operators. Providing 24 berths, 
7 694 meter of deep-water frontage and a water depth of 15.5 meter (50 feet), there 
are currently no restrictions on which vessel type that can use the port (ibid.).  
 
In 2005 Hong Kong actually lost its position as the world's busiest port to Singapore. 
Two years later the Port of Shanghai also surpassed Hong Kong (Legco, 2013). There 
is also a possibility that the rapid growing Shenzhen Port surpassed Hong Kong in 
2013, after Shenzhen handled 17.3 million TEUs in the first nine months of 2013 
compared to 16.4 million by Hong Kong. Hong Kong, Guangzhou and Shenzhen are 
in close competition as they are in close proximity to each other. The latter two have 
the advantage of lower handling costs. The three ports serve the Guangdong province, 
which has a population of 104 million people and is one of the most densely 
populated areas in China. All three ports have deep-water berths and cranes that can 
accommodate the largest container vessels.   
 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen are situated further inlands and the lower cost of inland 
transportation and storing more than offsets the cost of calling the port compared to 
the Port of Hong Kong. The cluster of ports in South China makes on-land costs more 
important. The advantages of Guangzhou and Shenzhen are highlighted in the 
following speckle and are based on a competitiveness report by the Hong Kong 
Legislative Council (Legco, 2013): 
 
• Closer proximity to the Pearl River Delta cargo sources, resulting in lower 
operational costs and transportation convenience 
• Lower terminal handling charges and road haulage costs  
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• The efficiency development are resulting in diminishing intangible cost 
advantage for Hong Kong, e.g. short vessel turnaround time 
• The Chinese government has undertaken substantial actions to boost 
competitiveness of Guangzhou and Shenzhen, including heavy investments in 
port infrastructure and the development of advanced logistic parks to facilitate 
trade flows 
3.5.4 Guangzhou 
The Port of Guangzhou is positioned in the center of the Pearl River Delta, which 
forms a well-developed transportation network. With a 400-kilometer coastline and 
173 kilometers of navigation channels the port is the largest trading port in South 
China – connecting in excess of 100 domestic ports and more than 350 foreign ports 
in over 80 countries and regions (Port of Guangzhou, 2014a). In 2011, 431 million 
tons and over 14 million TEUs were handled at the 510 berths at Guangzhou. The 
port administration estimates that the Port of Guangzhou will handle 600 million tons 
of cargo with a container throughput of 25 million TEUs by the year of 2020 (Port of 
Guangzhou, 2014b).  
3.5.5 Shenzhen 
Situated south in the Pearl River Delta with a 260-kilometer coastline, the Port of 
Shenzhen is about 20 sea miles from Hong Kong in the south and 60 sea miles from 
Guangzhou in the north. According to World Shipping Council (2014a) Shenzhen 
handled 22.94 million TEUs in 2012.   
3.5.6 Shanghai 
The Port of Shanghai is located east in China, facing the East China Sea to the east 
and Hangzhou Bay to the south. It is situated in the estuarial area of the Yangtze 
River, the Huangpu River and the Qiantang River – connecting the port with the 
Chinese inlands. Having handled a record number of 33.7 million TEU in 2013, the 
Port of Shanghai has been ranked as the number one port in the world for four 
consecutive years since 2010 (Port of Shanghai, 2014a). The Port of Shanghai has 
outperformed the Port of Hong Kong since 2007, but they do not serve the same cargo 
sources, as Shanghai is situated further east (Legco, 2013). Container terminal 
operation is a core business for the Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG), having 
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three major container port areas; namely Wusongkou, Waigaoqiao and Yangshan 
(Port of Shanghai, 2014b). These areas include seven large container terminals, 
operated by several companies. The Port of Shanghai does not have any vessel 
constraints.  
4 Theory 
4.1  Shipping market model 
The maritime economy is complex, and the model presented in Figure 5 is used to 
explain the dynamics. The demand module (A) centers on the cargo shippers. They 
determine how trade develops by making sourcing decisions (location of oil 
refineries, distribution centers, cargo handlings hubs etc.) as well as negotiating 
freight rates and time charters. On the supply side (B) there are shipping investors 
(shipping companies, private shipowners etc.). These are on the other side of the 
negotiations and have to make decisions regarding the ordering of new ships and 
scrapping of old ones. A and B balance and intervene in the freight market (module 
C). The freight rates are constantly adjusting to changes in the balance of supply and 
demand, controlling the amount of money paid by shippers to shipowners and thereby 
the flow of money which drives the shipping market. In our research the Panama 
Canal can be related to 2. Fleet Productivity in module B on the supply side. The 
expanded Panama Canal is part of an intricate market and may directly or indirectly 
influence different parts of the industry. 
 
From the model we see that the shipping industry derives from the world economy. 
Business cycles determine short-term cycles in sea trade, and a better shipping 
industry is expected in strong economic periods. Regional development cycles 
determine medium- to long-term trends in sea trade. Sourcing and manufacturing 
decisions will affect trade flows, as these shifts according to the decisions. Today 
there is a discrepancy between container trade flows to the U.S. from Asia. As more 
cargo is traded from Asia to the U.S., shipowners receive a higher freight rate on the 
fronthaul voyage than the backhaul voyage. In this case, fronthaul refers to the voyage 
from Asia to the U.S., and backhaul refers to the return trip from the U.S. to Asia. 
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Figure 5: Shipping market model (Stopford, 2009) 
4.2  Classification of costs 
In order to get an insight of the different costs a shipping company face, we must first 
distinguish between the natures of the different types of costs. We can divide costs 
into three main groups; Fixed costs, variable costs, and sunk costs. Fixed costs can be 
defined as costs that do not vary with the amount of goods or services produced by 
the company. Variable costs will be the costs that vary with the amount of goods or 
services that are produced, and sunk costs are costs that do not vary in accordance 
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with the decision alternatives because they have already incurred and cannot be 
recovered.  
 
According to Stopford (2009) the shipping industry has no internationally accepted 
standard cost classification, but in general we can classify costs into five categories. 
The first category is operating costs. These are the costs and expenses involved in the 
day-to-day running of a ship and usually include manning, insurance, stores, repairs 
and maintenance costs. The second category is voyage costs. These costs are directly 
related to a specific voyage and include costs such as fuel, canal fees and cargo 
handling fees. This is normally the biggest variable cost category for a shipping 
company. Operating costs occur regardless of voyage specifics, and are therefore 
calculated separately from voyage costs. The third category is cargo-handling costs. 
This category represents costs related to the loading, stowing and discharging of 
cargo, and has been given considerable attention, particularly in the liner business due 
to its significance in the total cost equation. In our model we will include cargo-
handling costs in the voyage costs because this is a common practice in container 
shipping. The fourth category is periodic maintenance costs. These costs normally 
incur when the ship is dry-docked for major repairs, and are generally treated 
separately from operating costs due to the large expenditure they may involve. This 
expenditure is normally more significant the older the ship is. The last and fifth 
category is capital costs. These costs depend on the way the ship has been financed.  
 
Operating costs are variable and related to the day-to-day running of the ship. Voyage 
costs, hereunder cargo-handling costs, are variable and related to each voyage. Capital 
costs are fixed and are usually considered as sunk cost. Periodic maintenance costs 
are a result of the usage of the ships and in that sense variable, but they are not 
considered when calculating the costs for a specific voyage. Consequently, we will 
not include capital costs and periodic maintenance costs in our model.  
4.3  Opportunity cost 
Opportunity cost, or alternative cost, is one of the most important and useful concepts 
in economic analysis because it highlights the consequences of making choices under 
conditions of scarcity (Keat et. al., p.277, 2014). Opportunity cost can be defined as 
the amount or subjective value that must be sacrificed in choosing one activity over 
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the next best alternative. In our research the opportunity cost will represent the cost of 
the alternative routes and which route is cheapest when compared directly. We will 
also treat the opportunity cost as the potential loss of income when spending more 
time at sea for a specific voyage. An alternative could also be to avoid sailing by 
docking the ship.  
4.4  Pricing 
A critical factor that must be considered when making pricing decision is the 
environment in which a company operates and competes (Keat et. al., p.79, 2014). In 
perfect competition the sole determinants for pricing decisions would be supply and 
demand. This would in turn make everyone a price taker (ibid.). In the case of the 
Panama Canal the market environment cannot be described by perfect competition. 
One could argue that parts of the Panama Canal market could conform to the 
monopoly assumption. Vessels travelling from Lima in Peru to the U.S. Gulf10 would 
presumably have few alternatives but to transit through the Canal. The difference 
between using the Panama Canal and sailing the Magellan Strait from Lima to 
Houston is 7 244 nautical miles and approximately 17 days when sailing 18 knots, 
which is not a realistic alternative.  
The container market is assumed to conform to the imperfect market condition 
assumption. This is a competitive market where the canals are price makers and can 
exercise a certain degree of control of their pricing (Keat et. al, 2014). This could give 
the ACP market power. One could further argue that the Panama Canal has 
oligopolistic power on the Asia - U.S. East Coast trade route alongside the Suez 
Canal, as both canals have large market shares on this route. Knowing what market 
the Panama Canal operates in makes it easier to discuss realistic pricing and scenario 
alternatives. 
4.5  Economies of scale 
If a firm`s long-term average cost declines as output increases, the firm is said to be 
experiencing economies of scale (Keat et. al., p.289, 2014). In shipping this relates to 
the connection between cost and ship size. This relationship is particularly important 
because operating, voyage and capital costs do not increase in proportion to the size 
of the vessel. Thus, using a bigger ship will reduce the unit freight cost (Stopford, 
                                                
10 Grieg Star sails this voyage. The port is called Callao and is situated close to Lima. 
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p.224, 2009). For example, a VLCC vessel of 280 000 DWT requires the same crew 
size as a 29 000 DWT tanker, but will only use a quarter as much fuel per deadweight 
tonne (Stopford, 2009).  
In 2005 the annual cost for a 170 000 DWT Capesize bulker was $ 74 per cargo tonne 
compared to $ 191 for a 30 000 DWT vessel. Thus, the owner of a large ship has a 
substantial cost advantage given that cargo volume and port facilities are available. It 
could further add an interesting element to the cost and income equation, as bigger 
vessels loose flexibility. This will impact the revenue side by limiting the ports the 
vessels can enter and the time spent in available ports. Those investing in the next 
generation of bigger ships will therefore always face the risk that they have 
overstepped the market (Stopford, 2009). This happened with crude oil tankers when 
the upsizing limited vessels to certain routes. The market went bust and changed, 
demanding vessel and route flexibility. 
 
We may potentially have two effects pulling in opposite directions. Shipowners 
pursue economies of scale by upsizing vessels, exemplified by Maersk and their 18 
000 TEU Triple-E vessels described in Chapter 3.2.2, while the Canal Authorities 
makes pricing decisions based on an imperfect market condition in a canal limited to 
13 200 TEU ships. 
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5 Model Description 
Following is a short description of the model we have developed in order to perform 
our analysis. The data used and assumptions taken are described in Chapter 6. A 
detailed model guide is presented in Appendix 1. The model is a macro-activated 
model developed in Microsoft Excel. It is dynamic, and gives the user the option to 
change the model input. The input cells are marked in red, and are all equipped with a 
scroll-down menu or a description of which values to insert.  
 
 
Figure 6: Cost comparison model 
The model displays the basic route and vessel information used in its calculations. It 
calculates all costs connected to each voyage, each vessel’s revenue and result for 
each of the four routes. The results are displayed in three different ways of measure:  
 
1. The Time-Charter Equivalent is calculated by dividing the voyage result on 
total days spent on a route or the period you analyze. The TCE is a shipping 
industry standard used to calculate the average daily revenue performance of a 
vessel. It is a measure that makes comparison between the spot market and the 
time-charter market possible. It also facilitates comparison across routes.  
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2. The Cost per TEU is calculated by dividing the total cost on the TEU carried. 
This is especially useful when comparing vessels of different size. This 
measure can be used to highlight large-scale advantages.  
 
3. The Daily Contribution to Capital is calculated by subtracting the daily 
operation cost from the TCE. This measures the daily profits for a vessel.  
 
Further the model contains the option to export a summary of the results to a new 
Excel workbook. There are also options to perform different sensitivity analyses for 
the four routes. These will be exported and calculated in a new Excel workbook. The 
different sensitivity analyses are: 
 
1. Fuel Sensitivity measures the Cost per TEU for each bunker price ranging 
from $ 400 to $ 800. The interval is based on historical data for Houston 
380CST bunker prices from 2009 to 2014 (Clarkson SIN, 2014).  
 
2. Speed Sensitivity gives us the change in Cost per TEU based on days at sea for 
vessel speeds ranging from 18 to 25. 
 
3. Load Factor Sensitivity calculates the change in Cost per TEU for load factors 
ranging from 40 to 100 percent. This is based on the lowest load factor used 
by Stopford (2009), which is a 40 percent load factor on backhaul trips to 
Asia. 
 
4. Freight Rate Sensitivity calculates the Cost per TEU for freight rates ranging 
from 2 000 USD/FEU to 4 000 USD/FEU. The interval is based on historical 
data for the SCFI Shanghai - EC America freight rate from 2009 to 2014 
(Clarkson SIN, 2014). 
 
5. Sea Margin Sensitivity calculates the change in Cost per TEU for sea margins 
ranging from 0 percent to 15 percent. Grieg Star normally operates with a sea 
margin of 5 percent on their voyages, and account for severe circumstances by 
adding to this sea margin if necessary.  
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The model also provides the option to perform a round-trip scenario. It takes into 
account the difference between the fronthaul and backhaul voyage, and displays 
calculations for a single round-trip voyage and an annual round-trip scenario. The 
model contains the option to export a summary of the results to a new Excel 
workbook. 
 
 
Figure 7:  Round-trip calculation model 
6 Data 
6.1  Route Information 
The model will render the possibility to sail the trade route between Asia and the U.S. 
East Coast. There is a substantial cargo imbalance on this trade. In 2012, eastbound 
exports from Asia to the U.S. were 14.4 million TEU, while the westbound exports 
only were 7.5 million TEU (World Shipping Council, 2014b). In 2013, total Chinese 
exports to the U.S. were $ 370 billion, while imports from the U.S. to China were $ 
152 billion (CIA, 2014). This is also the trade route that has the most traffic amongst 
the trade routes transiting through the Panama Canal (ACP, 2013c).11 
We have chosen the port of New York and Los Angeles as the ports to represent the 
U.S. in our model as these will be able to accommodate Post-Panamax and ULCV 
vessels in time for the finished expansion, as well as being in the top bracket of 
                                                
11 Note that Container Liner Services normally have several port calls on a voyage. This is not 
accounted for in the model.  
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trafficked container ports in the U.S. (WSC, 2014). In Asia we have chosen the Port 
of Shanghai and the cluster of ports in South China, represented in the model by 
Guangzhou, Hong Kong and Shenzhen. These ports are heavily trafficked by 
container vessels both in port calls and volume, and are able to accommodate ULCV. 
Shanghai is the largest container port in the world measured in volume throughput 
and a large part of the trade going through the Panama Canal is therefore linked to the 
Port of Shanghai. 
 
The different sea distances are measured in nautical miles and are collected from Sea 
Distances (2014) and Sea Rates (2014). Each voyage could be traveled via five 
waypoints in our model: through the Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, round the Cape 
Horn, the Cape of Good Hope or by using the U.S. Intermodal System. The different 
sea distances are presented in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2: Route distances 
6.1.1 Time at sea 
To calculate how many days a vessel spend at sea, we use a simple formula: 
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!! = !!24  
 
where TS is total travelling time in days, D is total distance travelled in nautical miles, 
and V is average speed of the vessel in knots. This is then divided by 24 hours to get 
the total travelling time in days.  
Usually, a sea margin is added when calculating the total time spent at sea. The sea 
margin accounts for changes in speed and possible detours from the route due to e.g. 
bad weather, and is often calculated in percentage or days.  To account for these 
unforeseen factors we will add a sea margin of at least 5 % to all voyages12.  
It is also normal for vessels to spend time waiting in line to pass through the Suez and 
Panama Canal, and to use a lower travelling speed when passing through the canals. 
To avoid waiting in line, shipowners have the alternative to pay for a Just-In-Time 
(JIT) service, where the vessel will pass through the canals directly upon arrival. 
When using this service, shipowners will often regulate the vessel's speed to arrive 
directly at the scheduled transit time. To account for the time a vessel spend waiting 
to transit, we will use the average waiting time for each canal. This is approximately 
18 hours for the Panama Canal (ACP, 2013a) and 5 hours for the Suez Canal (SCA, 
2014a). The fuel consumption while waiting will be equivalent to the fuel 
consumption in port. Thus, the time spent waiting will therefore be added to the time 
spent in port and the calculation for fuel consumption in port will, in that way, also 
account for the fuel costs while waiting.  
6.1.2 Time in port 
The time spent in port for a vessel relies on several different factors, such as (Harries 
et. al., 2013): 
 
• Actual distribution of containers onboard 
• Container slots scheduled for loading and unloading 
• Availability and utilization of cranes 
• Speed and equipment of cranes (e.g. spreaders) 
• On-shore handling of containers 
• Time needed for maneuvering and mooring    
                                                
12 Grieg Star normally operates with a sea margin of 5 % on their voyages. 
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• Delays due to wind and waves in port (causing container swaying and ship 
motion) 
• Possible idle times (e.g. waiting for availability of special equipment and 
personnel) 
 
Another important factor is the amount of cargo the vessel is scheduled to load or 
unload. In most instances for container liner services, a vessel will stop by several 
ports on its way to its final destination. However, in our model we assume that a 
vessel will load all its cargo in one single port and unload all its cargo in another. 
Since the total time spent in port is related to the amount of cargo a vessel is 
scheduled to carry on its voyage, we will base our calculations on the average berth 
productivity per hour, i.e. how many containers (measured in TEU) a port is able to 
move on average per hour. This information is collected from a research on port 
productivity by the Journal of Commerce (2013) which indicate that more and more 
ports and terminals now operate close to 24 hours a day. The closer a port comes to 
running a round-the-clock operation, the higher its berth productivity becomes, given 
that this leads to less down time for its operations. We will assume that all ports in our 
analysis will run a 24/7 operation. We also assume that all the administrative work 
related to the voyage will be performed during the loading and unloading of the cargo, 
making the vessel ready to leave the port when the cargo handling is finished. For our 
U.S. ports, the average berth productivity per hour is 52 TEUs for both New York and 
Los Angeles. For the Asian ports, the research shows that Shanghai and Hong Kong 
are amongst the top 10 transshipment ports in the world with an average berth 
productivity of 86 and 68 TEUs per hour, while Guangzhou moves an average of 73 
TEUs per hour and Shenzhen an average of 75 TEU. To calculate the time spent in 
port we use the following formula: 
 !! = !(!!×!24) 
 
Where TP is time spent in port, L represents the amount of containers loaded or 
unloaded to the vessel, and P is the average berth productivity per hour. This is then 
multiplied with 24 hours to get the time in days. 
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6.2  Ship information 
All the information on the different container ships is collected from Clarkson 
Shipping Intelligence Network (2014) and is up-to-date real information down to each 
individual vessel. We have chosen to include the current container ship fleet of 
Panamax and Post-Panamax vessels in our model – in total 875 Panamax vessels and 
1 208 Post-Panamax vessels (1st of April, 2014). Since our main focus is directed 
towards achieving economies of scale by using larger vessels, and the fact that large 
vessels are preferred for long-distance voyages, we do not see it necessary to include 
the smaller ship classes as these are of less relevance for our research.  
The most important information derived for each vessel is their design speed and TEU 
capacity. In our model we use the design speed proposed by Notteboom and Carriou 
(2009) for different vessel categories based on TEU capacity to quantify the fuel 
consumption. The ship information is also used when calculating travelling time, 
cargo handling and when calculating the cost of transiting through the canals. It is 
important to notice that the design speed used in our model is based on an average for 
different vessel categories and may not be entirely accurate as to what the design 
speed for a specific vessel might be. However, we will be able to account for these 
inaccuracies by completing fuel sensitivity analyses that will account for all speeds 
for the vessels (between 18 - 25 knots), not only the average design speed.  The actual 
calculation of fuel consumption is further explained in Chapter 6.5.1. 
6.3  Key variables 
Bunker prices are collected from Bunker World (2014) and Ship & Bunker (2014). 
Bunker prices vary for each port, and depending on which port the vessel starts its 
voyage, the fuel costs might be significantly different.  
 
Freight rates also differ and depend on where the cargo is exported. For example, 
cargo sent from Shanghai to New York can have a freight rate per FEU of $ 3 000, i.e. 
$ 1 500 per TEU, while on the same distance, only from New York to Shanghai, the 
same cargo can have a freight rate per FEU of $ 1 500, or $ 750 per TEU. This pricing 
difference is a product of the cargo imbalance between Asia and the U.S. mentioned 
in Chapter 6.1.  Freight rates are collected from Drewry Container Insight Weekly 
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(2014) and the different shipping exchanges such as the Shanghai Shipping Exchange 
(2014). 
6.4  Operating costs 
The operating costs are collected from the Drewry Annual Report for Ship Operating 
Costs (2013). These costs are based on a daily average for different ship size 
categories. The Drewry report does not account for all ship sizes when presenting the 
daily average operating costs. For vessels that fall outside the categories presented by 
Drewry, we will simply use the costs represented by the category closest to the actual 
vessel. For example, a vessel with a capacity of 7 000 TEU will have the same daily 
operating costs as the vessels in the category 8-9 000 TEU. For the largest vessels 
with a capacity up to 18 000 TEU, we will use the daily operating costs presented for 
vessels in the category 10-12 000 TEU. It is fair to assume that cost items such as 
insurance and stores, spares and lubricating oil will be more sensitive to the size of a 
vessel. However, we will only use available data. 
Daily operating costs are calculated by using the following formula: 
 !" = ! + ! + ! + !" +!" 
 
Where OP is operating costs, M is manning, I is insurance, S is stores, spares and 
lubricating oils, RM is repairs and maintenance, and MA is management and 
administration. 
 
The total operating costs (OC) will be calculated by using a formula based on the 
amount of days the vessel is operated for each voyage: 
 !" = !! + !! !×! " 
6.5  Voyage costs 
Total voyage costs are calculated by using the following formula: 
 !" = !" + !" + !"! + !" 
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where VC is voyage costs, FC is fuel costs for main engine and auxiliaries, PA is port 
administrative fee, CHC is cargo handling costs in port, and CD is canal dues 
(including administrative fees and cargo fees).  This formula is based on the formula 
used by Stopford (2009), with some alterations. As mentioned earlier, we calculate 
cargo-handling costs as part of the total voyage costs.  
6.5.1 Fuel costs 
When finding the specific voyage fuel costs we have based our calculations on a fuel 
consumption model developed by Notteboom and Carriou (2009): 
 
 
Table 3: Fuel consumption model (Notteboom & Carriou, 2009) 
This model is based on 594 observations, and contains fuel consumption in tonnes per 
day for vessel speeds from 18 to 25 knots for different vessel categories divided by 
TEU capacity. After comparing the fuel consumption provided in this model with 
similar studies, we have found it to be accurate for vessels with a capacity ranging 
from 2 000 to 10 000 TEU. Due to a limited number of observations for vessels with 
10 000+ capacity (17 observations) the fuel consumption for these ships is not quite 
as accurate. Significant reductions in speed for Ultra-Large Container Vessels have 
become a widely accepted practice, and it is not unnatural for one of Maersk´s Triple-
E vessels to sail at 12 knots instead of 24 knots (Maersk, 2014). The model does not 
account for extra slow steaming which would be of more relevance for ULCV 
vessels. This is due to the lack of fuel consumption data for vessel speeds below 18 
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knots. However, for our purpose this model provides enough information to calculate 
a fairly accurate estimate for fuel consumption even if we are not able to calculate 
consumption for speeds lower than 18 knots. 
The total fuel costs are calculated by using the following formula: 
 !" = !! !×! ! + !!!×!!! !×!! 
 
Where FC is total fuel costs, TS is days spent at sea, FS is fuel consumption at sea 
measured in tonnes/day, TP is days spent in port, FP is fuel consumption in port 
measured in tonnes/day, and P is fuel unit cost per metric ton.  
Fuel consumption at sea can be derived from the fuel consumption model for each 
individual vessel based on the capacity (TEU) and speed of the vessel (V).  
Fuel consumption in port is calculated as a percentage of the vessels fuel consumption 
at sea when sailing at its design speed. This percentage is set at 5 % of consumption at 
sea13. This is an estimation we have chosen due to lack of precise information and to 
avoid going too deep into the specifications of vessel engines. For our purpose, we 
assess this to be representative for all vessels.  
6.5.2 Port and cargo-handling costs 
When calculating cargo-handling costs (also referred to as terminal handling charges) 
we use an average handling cost per TEU based on a report on terminal handling 
charges by the European Commission (2009): 
 
 
Table 4: Terminal handling charges (European Commission, 2009) 
The handling charges are port specific, and even if they are not recent figures we still 
assess them to be of satisfying relevance after comparing several sources that 
provides us with similar handling charges. It is worth mentioning that in some cases 
the handling cost per TEU may be discounted if the vessel loads or unloads larger 
                                                
13 A Grieg Star vessel with a 41.5 mt consumption at sea has an average consumption in port 
of 2 mt. This is approximately 5 %. 
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amounts of containers, i.e. the more containers handled, the lower the cargo handling 
price per TEU. Stopford (2009) claims that THC benefits from economies of scale 
since they are levied on ship tonnage. This will not be accounted for in our analysis, 
as we do not have access to more information than the average cost. 
 
Individual port-cost items are costs that do not directly relate to the actual loading and 
unloading of cargo, and often include:  
 
• Harbor and light dues  
• Pilotage  
• Towage  
• Mooring/unmooring  
• Other ancillary charges  
 
Our port cost calculations are based on a port benchmarking research performed by 
the Hong Kong Marine Department (2006), presenting the benchmarking port costs 
for the top 20 container ports in 2005. This is an updated report based on a 
comparative study performed in 2001, and include a benchmark for all the ports we 
use in our research except Guangzhou, for which we will use a regional average 
benchmark that we have calculated based on the findings in the report. Note that 
mooring and ancillary charges for New York and Los Angeles are included in the 
other charges. The calculations are presented in Table 5. 
 
 
Table 5: Port administration charges 
As the figures found in this report can be assumed to be somewhat outdated, we have 
compared them to the average port costs in Houston for a L-class Open Hatch vessel 
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operated by Grieg Star14 (Appendix 2). Based on this, we have set an average annual 
growth rate of 2 % to convert the 2005-figures into more realistic figures for 201415.  
6.5.3 Canal dues 
The Panama Canal toll is measured using tariffs collected from the ACP website 
(ACP, 2014e)16. The toll structure is designed by charging by the total capacity of a 
vessel, and the amount of containers carried. The ACP charges transits per TEU based 
on the following tolls (2011): 
 
1. Toll per TEU capacity  $ 74 
2. Toll per container with cargo  $ 8 
3. Toll per TEU capacity (ballast) $ 65.60 
 
This means that a vessel will pay $ 74 per TEU of its total capacity, and for each 
container with cargo there will be an additional toll of $ 8. A vessel that transits the 
Canal in ballast, i.e. without cargo, will be charges $ 65.60 per TEU of its total 
capacity. Other significant fees when a vessel transits the Canal are: 
 
• Tug hire 
• Line handling 
• Locomotive and wires 
• Security fee 
• Inspection fee 
• PCSOPEP fee (Panama Canal Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan) 
• Bank fees 
• Fumigation fee 
• Launch service 
• Agency fee 
• Incidentals 
                                                
14 In addition, Grieg Star pays a daily port charge. However, due to the lack of information 
about daily port charges on the specific ports, we will only use the figures presented in Table 
7. 
15 The port charges are not assumed to be a perfect reproduction of reality. However, it is 
natural to believe that the charges have increased. 
16 We do not account for possible long-term contracts between the ACP and Container Liner 
Services, which could lead to lower transit costs.  
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These vary depending on the vessel size, type and its maneuvering system, but will 
not be considerably different from the figures in our calculations. Our calculations are 
based on a transit invoice from a Grieg Star vessel transiting the Canal in January 
2014 (Appendix 3).  
  
The Suez Canal transit costs can be calculated by using a transit calculator provided 
by the Suez Canal Authority (SCA, 2014b). However, we have found it more reliable 
to use the calculations made by Notteboom & Rodrigue (2011a) presented in Table 6, 
as they have calculated the transit fees based on a vessels TEU capacity. 
 
 
Table 6: Suez Canal transit fees 
The tolls for a container vessel transiting the Suez Canal are based on the weight of 
the vessel rather than the amount of TEUs carried. Thus, a vessel transiting the Canal 
will pay a certain fee per tonne for the first 5 000 tonnes carried, then a slightly lower 
fee per tonne for the next 5 000, and so on. Based on the average cost per TEU 
calculated in Table 6, we have estimated the average cost for an 18 000 TEU vessel. 
Since the change in cost from 8 000 TEU to 10 000 TEU and 10 000 TEU to 13 000 
TEU has an average decrease per TEU of 6 %, we have estimated the cost per TEU 
based on the same percentage. The stable decrease in cost per TEU related to the 
TEU-capacity of the vessels is presented in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Average cost per TEU-capacity for the Suez Canal 
The SCA also charge for other services related to the transit, such as: 
 
• Tugs 
• Mooring 
• Pilotage 
• Disbursements 
 
We use the SCA transit calculator to find the fees for other services related to transits 
through the Suez Canal. We assume a fully laden container ship in three different 
sizes – a Panamax vessel with a capacity of 5 200 TEU, a Post-Panamax vessel with a 
capacity of 13 200 TEU and a Post-Panamax vessel, representing the ULCV class, of 
18 000 TEU. The reason why we do not calculate for several ship sizes is a 
consequence of the scope of our research and by using the largest ship size able to 
transit the Panama Canal pre-expansion (~5200 TEU), post-expansion (~13 200 TEU) 
and the largest ship size able to transit the Suez Canal (~18 000 TEU), we will cover 
the most important ship sizes for our analysis. 
6.6  Capital costs 
The capital costs of a vessel differ from the other cost categories in the way that the 
other costs, such as operating and voyage costs, are necessary for the ships trade 
ability, while capital costs are obligations which have no direct effect on its physical 
trade (Stopford, 2009). When a ship is built there exist an initial purchase of the 
vessel and payment to the shipyard, this is followed by periodic cash payments to 
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banks or equity investors who put up the capital to purchase the vessel, and finally, if 
the shipowner decides to sell the vessel, cash received from the sale (ibid.). The 
annual capital costs of a vessel can be calculated by using the following formula: 
 ! = !(!")1− (1+ !)!! 
 
Where P is payment, PV is present value (purchase price of the vessel), r is rate per 
period, and n is number of periods. This is an annuity payment formula and is used to 
calculate the periodic payment on an annuity. According to a research made by MAN 
Diesel & Turbo (2008) the lifetime of almost all container ships is higher or equal to 
25 years, and only 9 % are older than 25 years. It is therefore natural to base the 
calculation of capital costs on a lifetime between 20 - 30 years for a vessel. It is also 
not improbable that a shipowner calculates for an expected sale of the vessel by the 
end of its lifetime. 
As mentioned in Chapter 4.2, the capital cost of a vessel is considered sunk cost, and 
is therefore not of any particular relevance when comparing the different route 
alternatives. Instead, we calculate the daily contribution to capital costs from each 
specific route.  
7 Analysis 
In this chapter, we will compare the costs for the different route alternatives to assess 
the competitiveness of the Panama Canal. We will start by looking at scenarios using 
the Panama Canal before the expansion to get a picture of the current situation before 
we look at scenarios after the expansion. Further, we will look at different round-trip 
scenarios to identify the consequences related to the trade-off between time and cost. 
Finally, we will discuss the sensitivity of key variables that are not covered during the 
initial analysis.  
 
We will perform our analysis scenarios with three different vessel sizes to cover the 
most important ship classes. The vessels will be existing vessels collected from the 
Clarkson SIN database presented in Table 7. 
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Table 7: Vessel overview 
Octavia will represent the Panamax vessel segment, which are the largest vessels able 
to transit the old locks of the Panama Canal. With a TEU-capacity of 5 117 TEU it is 
one of the largest vessels in the Panamax register (Clarkson SIN, 2014). The Octavia 
does, however, have a draft that exceeds the Panama Canal restrictions, so it will not 
be able to transit the Canal fully laden. MSC Paloma will represent the Post-Panamax 
vessel segment, which is the ship category that will be able to fit the new locks of the 
Panama Canal after its expansion. With a TEU-capacity of 13 200 TEU, the MSC 
Paloma represent one of the largest ships expected to be able to transit the Canal after 
the expansion. The Majestic Maersk is one of the largest ships in the world, and will 
with its 18 270 TEU-capacity represent the ULCV segment. As of today, there are 
only six vessels of this size, but there are approximately 25 vessels in the orderbook 
with the latest order scheduled for delivery by the end of 2015. The ULCV class is 
able to sail all routes except through the Panama Canal.  
Due to the fact that we are using existing vessels, we will use their design speed as a 
basis when we run the different scenarios, i.e. 25 knots for Octavia, 23 knots for MSC 
Paloma (rounded down from 23.5 due to information availability on fuel 
consumption) and 23 knots for Majestic Maersk. In addition, we will use a load factor 
of 80 % as a basis for all vessels in our scenarios.  
All analysis scenarios will be based on key figures collected the 9th of May 2014: 
• Bunker price IFO 380: 
o Shanghai: 614 USD/mt 
o Hong Kong: 600.50 USD/mt 
o New York: 613 USD/mt 
• Freight rate: 
o Shanghai - USEC (Base port): 3 328 USD/FEU 
o USEC - Shanghai: 1530 USD/FEU 
 
Thus, all voyage calculations for routes from Shanghai will be calculated with a 
bunker price of 614 USD/mt and routes from Hong Kong, Guangzhou and Shenzhen 
will be calculated with the Hong Kong bunker price of 600.50 USD/mt. The Shanghai 
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- USEC freight rate will be representative for all routes from Asia to the U.S. East 
Coast.  
7.1  Before the Panama Canal expansion 
To set a basis for comparing different scenarios we want to look at how the current 
situation is. In the following analysis we will compare the current costs of sailing the 
different routes. This will give us a perspective on how the competitive situation is 
and what the determining factors are when deciding which route to sail. We will start 
by performing simple analyses for single routes going from Asia to the U.S. East 
Coast, including a comparison of costs. Then we will examine relevant variables and 
their sensitivity. 
7.1.1 Scenario 1. The Panamax vessel 
The first analysis is based on a simple scenario where we compare the different route 
alternatives when assuming that the same vessel, a Panamax vessel, is used. This way, 
we are able to focus on the costs for a shipowner, without assuming that he has the 
ability to choose between different ship sizes.  
The results from the scenario are presented in Table 8. 
 
 
Table 8: Scenario 1 – Overview results 
Four different points of departure are presented. All voyages have New York as a 
destination and the shipowner has the choice between five different sailing routes. 
Common for all voyages, independent of point of departure, is that the intermodal 
choice is unrealistically expensive compared to the other alternatives. This is because 
it is expensive to transport cargo across the entire U.S. continent17 and because of the 
                                                
17 Grieg Star has confirmed this. They have performed their own analysis and found it to be a 
non-competitive alternative. 
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complexity of the U.S. Intermodal System. Since our target destination for all 
scenarios will be the U.S. East Coast, represented by New York, we will exclude the 
intermodal alternative for the rest of the analysis and point our focus towards all-
water routes.  
 
For the voyage between Shanghai and New York, transiting through the Panama 
Canal is the most profitable and less costly alternative with a cost per TEU of $ 1 181 
and a Time Charter Equivalent (TCE) of $ 89 477 (Table 8). This is mainly due to the 
shorter distance, which will lead to lower fuel costs for the voyage.  
On the other hand, if we look at the voyage between Hong Kong and New York we 
can see that the distance (Table 8) is more equal for the route through the Panama 
Canal and the Suez Canal. In this case, the Suez Canal is the preferred alternative with 
a cost per TEU of $ 1 388 compared to $ 1 390 through the Panama Canal. This is 
interesting, because it means that most of the difference between the two canal 
alternatives seems to be related to the cost of transiting the canals.  
 
If we compare Hong Kong with Guangzhou and Shenzhen, we can already see that 
the difference between the route alternatives is similar for the three ports: 
 
 
Figure 9: Port comparison 
As we already know, these ports are located in close proximity to each other and the 
difference in cost per TEU will therefore mostly be explained by the cargo handling 
costs in port, which is much lower for Guangzhou and Shenzhen compared to the port 
of Hong Kong. Since our focus is on comparing route alternatives, finding the 
cheapest port alternatives is not necessarily in the scope of our research. Based on our 
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findings in Figure 9, we can therefore carry out our further analyses with Hong Kong 
as a representative for the three ports. 
 
Due to the small difference in sailing distance on the Hong Kong - New York voyage, 
we will be able to compare routes based on the sensitivity of key variables. Further, 
the Shanghai - New York voyage represents an interesting voyage for the ACP due to 
the advantage of shorter sailing distance on the Panama Canal voyage and the high 
amount of volume traded through the Port of Shanghai. 
7.1.1.1  Speed sensitivity 
One of the most influential variables in the total voyage cost is the speed of the vessel. 
We run our scenarios based on the design speed for each vessel, but in many instances 
the speed can be changed to optimize the voyage. In Table 9 we present the speed 
sensitivity for a Panamax vessel on the Shanghai - New York voyage:  
 
 
Table 9: Scenario 1 – Speed sensitivity, Shanghai - New York 
What is important to notice in the speed sensitivity analysis is the relationship 
between the cost per TEU and the days spent at sea. For the shipowner this represents 
a tradeoff between spending less time at sea at the expense of a higher cost and 
lowering the cost at the expense of spending more time at sea. For example, in this 
case we see that a vessel can lower its speed to approximately 22 knots when sailing 
the Panama Canal route, and arrive in New York at a much lower cost within the 
same time window as if it sails at 25 knots through the Suez Canal.   
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For Hong Kong - New York we see that the same vessel sailing the Panama Canal 
would have to lower its average speed by approximately 1 knot at the account of 
spending more time at sea to compete with the lower cost of transiting through the 
Suez Canal: 
 
 
Table 10: Scenario 1 – Speed sensitivity, Hong Kong - New York 
Another interesting observation is that the lowest cost per TEU can be achieved by 
sailing the Good Hope route at a slow-steam pace of 18 knots. This will, however, 
take more than 35 days from Shanghai and approximately 33 days from Hong Kong. 
The question again is how many days a shipowner is willing to let the vessel spend at 
sea to lower its voyage costs, when the alternative would be spending this time 
generating income on another voyage18. 
7.1.1.2  Sea margin 
Another variable that may influence the choice of route is the sea margin. As 
mentioned earlier, the sea margin is related to weather conditions and other 
unforeseen influences. We operate with a 5 % sea margin, but this may have to be 
altered for the longer routes such as those rounding the Cape Horn and the Cape of 
Good Hope. Table 11 presents the sensitivity of sea margin for the Hong Kong - New 
York route, based on the cost per TEU. 
                                                
18 In addition cargo owners may be willing to pay the extra price and receive their goods 
faster. 
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Table 11: Sea margin sensitivity 
Given the time of year, the weather may be harsher for the routes around Cape Horn 
and Good Hope, and a higher sea margin would be more realistic. For example, with a 
more realistic sea margin of 8 %, the route around the Cape of Good Hope becomes 
less attractive compared to the safer and shorter alternatives through the canals.  
7.1.2 Scenario 2. Economies of scale 
In this scenario, we will look at the possible advantages of sailing a larger vessel on 
the routes that are without any constraints. We will compare the following 
alternatives: 
• A 5 117 TEU Panamax vessel through the Panama Canal 
• A 13 200 TEU Post-Panamax vessel on all other routes 
• A 18 270 TEU ULCV vessel on all other routes 
This will allow us to investigate which large-scale advantages that exist, given that 
the shipowner has the possibility to choose between different ship sizes, and is able to 
exploit the cargo capacity on the larger vessels. As mentioned, we do not account for 
investment and capital costs in our analysis, which could present a bigger cost for 
larger vessels. In addition, for this and further analyses we will use a sea margin of 8 
% for the two route alternatives Cape Horn and Good Hope.  
 
  
Figure 10: Scenario 2 – Cost per TEU overview 
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Figure 10 presents a comparison of the cost per TEU when sailing the Shanghai and 
Hong Kong voyage with all three ships. The cost per TEU for the Panama Canal route 
is for the Octavia vessel, which is the only vessel that can transit that canal, while the 
MSC Paloma represents the other alternatives on the blue line, and the Majestic 
Maersk on the red line. It is easy to see that economies of scale can be exploited by 
sailing larger ships on the alternative routes.  
7.1.2.1  Load factor 
Table 12 displays the load factor sensitivity for the Hong Kong - New York voyage: 
 
 
Table 12: Scenario 2 – Load factor sensitivity 
The previous results are based on an 80 % load factor. The load factor may vary 
depending on the vessel size, as larger vessels depend on a higher demand and cargo 
supply to uphold the same load factor. Consequently, a larger vessel may be forced to 
sail with a lower load factor than a small vessel. Given that the larger vessels are not 
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able to sail with an 80 % load factor, this sensitivity analysis shows that a 13 200 
TEU vessel needs a 55 % load factor if sailing the Suez Canal to compete on cost with 
the 5 117 TEU vessel sailing through the Panama Canal. Further, it will need a 70 % 
load factor to sail the Cape Horn route, and a 57 % load factor to sail the Good Hope 
route. For a 18 270 TEU vessel the load factor can be as low as 42 % through the 
Suez Canal and Good Hope, and 51 % for the Cape Horn route.  
 
For the Shanghai - New York voyage we got similar results, but due to the longer 
sailing distance for the alternative routes, and consequently higher fuel costs, the 
necessary load factor will be slightly higher than for the Hong Kong - New York 
voyage.  
7.1.3 Summary  
From the pre-expansion scenarios, we see that the cost per TEU is inversely 
proportional with the increase in vessel size sailed on the alternative routes. This 
confirms our expectations for large-scale advantages, and it emphasizes the 
competitive disadvantage of having constraining locks in the Panama Canal. The 
different sensitivity analyses show us that the results are sensitive to changes in key 
variables. This becomes important when the shipowners decide whether or not they 
want to sail at a higher cost to avoid losing possible income from spending more time 
at sea for each voyage.   
7.2  After the Panama Canal expansion 
In this chapter, we will compare the costs of sailing the different routes with scenarios 
after the expansion of the Panama Canal. First, we will use the same tariff rates for 
transiting the Canal as before the expansion. Then, we will look at how much the 
tariffs needs to change for the Panama Canal to stay competitive. Key variables in this 
analysis will be equal to those used in the previous scenarios.  
7.2.1 Scenario 3. The Post-Panamax vessel 
In this scenario we compare the costs of sailing the MSC Paloma, a 13 200 TEU 
vessel, on all routes. This is based on the expectation that the MSC Paloma will 
represent the largest vessel able to transit the new locks of the expanded Panama 
Canal. 
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Figure 11: Scenario 3 – Cost per TEU overview 
As displayed in Figure 11, we see that a vessel transiting through the Panama Canal 
will have a slight cost advantage on the Shanghai - New York voyage, but on the 
Hong Kong - New York voyage it will still be advantageous to sail the Suez Canal or 
around the Cape of Good Hope.  
 
 
Figure 12: Scenario 3 – Cost overview Shanghai - New York 
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Figure 13: Scenario 3 – Cost overview Hong Kong - New York 
From Figure 12 and 13, we see that the major difference in cost still can be explained 
by the discrepancy in canal fees. When determining if the Panama Canal is priced too 
high compared to the Suez Canal, we must remember that the time advantage of 
transiting through the Panama Canal might outplay the cost advantage of transiting 
the alternative routes.  We will therefore perform a speed sensitivity analysis. 
7.2.1.1  Speed sensitivity 
Table 13 presents the speed sensitivity for the Hong Kong - New York voyage: 
 
 
Table 13: Scenario 3 – Speed sensitivity, Hong Kong - New York 
Keeping in mind that the operating speed is 23 knots for MSC Paloma, we see that if 
a vessel transiting the Panama Canal lower its speed to average slightly above 22 
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knots, it will be able to transit at the same cost per TEU in almost the same amount of 
time as if the vessel transits the Suez Canal at operating speed.  
For the Shanghai - New York voyage the difference in sailing time is greater. The 
MSC Paloma could lower its speed to an average of 20 knots and still be able to arrive 
in New York in approximately the same amount of days (approximately 23 days) as 
through the Suez Canal route. This would decrease the cost per TEU from $ 1 009 to 
$ 918 on the Panama Canal route, while the cost per TEU on the Suez Canal route 
would be $ 1 030.  
7.2.2 Scenario 4. Economies of scale 
In this scenario, we will perform the same analysis as we did in the pre-expansion 
chapter, where we look at the possible advantages of sailing a larger vessel on the 
routes that are without any constraints. Now, we will compare the following 
alternatives: 
• A 13 200 TEU Post-Panamax vessel through the Panama Canal 
• A 18 270 TEU ULCV vessel on all other routes 
 
 
Figure 14: Scenario 4 – Cost per TEU overview 
As expected, the results in Figure 14 show us that the hypothesis of large-scale 
advantages still holds. The MSC Paloma has a higher cost per TEU than the Majestic 
Maersk has on the alternative routes. This indicates that the Panama Canal will still 
meet competition from the ULCV segment after the expansion. 
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7.2.2.1  Load factor sensitivity 
Table 14 presents the load factor sensitivity for the Hong Kong - New York voyage: 
 
 
Table 14: Scenario 4 – Load factor sensitivity 
Given that the larger vessels are not able to sail with an 80 % load factor, this 
sensitivity analysis shows that a 18 270 TEU vessel needs a 57 % load factor if sailing 
the Suez Canal to compete on cost with the 13 200 TEU vessel sailing through the 
Panama Canal with an 80 % load factor. Further, the 18 270 TEU vessel will need a 
69 % load factor to sail the Cape Horn route, and a 57 % load factor to sail the Good 
Hope route. 
 
On the Shanghai - New York voyage, the larger vessel would need a higher load 
factor due to the advantage of shorter sailing distance through the Panama Canal. The 
Majestic Maersk would need a 67 % load factor to sail the Suez Canal or the Good 
Hope, and a 73 % load factor to sail the Cape Horn route to compete on cost with the 
MSC Paloma at an 80 % load factor sailing the Panama Canal route.  
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7.2.3 Summary 
From the post-expansion scenarios, we see that the cost per TEU still is inversely 
proportional with the increase in vessel size sailed on the alternative routes. We also 
observe that the cost per TEU when transiting the Panama Canal on the Hong Kong - 
New York voyage is almost equivalent to the cost per TEU of transiting through the 
Suez Canal if the speed is lowered when sailing the Panama Canal route.  
7.3  Panama Canal tolls 
Now that we have looked at basic scenarios for the competitive situation after the 
expansion with the current canal tariffs, it would be interesting to see how a change in 
the Panama Canal tariff would affect its competitiveness.  
Since the sailing distance between Hong Kong - New York is fairly similar through 
the Panama Canal and the Suez Canal, we can use this route to isolate the transit fee 
from other variables that would complicate the comparison.  
In the model, we use the solver-function to find the possible change in Panama Canal 
tariffs by setting the cost per TEU to be equal for both voyages. Given the current 
bunker and freight rates, the result indicates that the Panama Canal should decrease 
their tariffs per TEU capacity by approximately 28 %, from $ 74 per TEU to $ 54 to 
stay competitive with the Suez Canal. It is important to understand that this will still 
generate a much higher income for the ACP per Post-Panamax vessel transiting than 
the income per Panamax vessel paying the old tariffs. To compare, a Post-Panamax 
vessel with 80 % load factor will have to pay more than $ 800 000 to transit, while a 
Panamax vessel with the same load factor will pay around $ 400 000. So even if the 
tariff per TEU capacity goes down, the total income generated for the ACP per transit 
will still increase with the size of the vessel.  
 
This change in tariffs is closely related to the additional fuel costs on the Suez route. 
In Table 15 we look at how much the Panama Canal transit cost per TEU capacity 
would have to change to compete with the Suez Canal route given different bunker 
price scenarios. 
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Table 15: Tariff rates – Bunker price sensitivity.  
We have tested for the current bunker price and two additional bunker price scenarios. 
By testing for significant changes in bunker price we strengthen the effect of the 
result. For the Shanghai - New York voyage we see that the cost per TEU capacity 
actually could be increased. Further, we see that the effect from a change in bunker 
price is much larger for the Shanghai voyage than for the Hong Kong voyage, which 
is an expected result due to the disparity in sailing distance between the routes on the 
Shanghai voyage. Note that we do not account for the relationship between speed and 
sailing days for the canal routes, which would further strengthen the change in cost 
per TEU capacity. 
 
Given that the bunker price were to decrease, it would have a negative impact on the 
competitiveness of the Panama Canal. Hence, a possible solution could be to link the 
tariffs to the bunker price.  
  
  70 
   
7.4  Round-trip 
To be able to get a better perspective on the importance of the tradeoff between time 
and cost, we will have to look at the different alternative routes in a larger perspective 
than just single voyages. Thus, for the next chapter we will perform round-trip 
scenarios with a one-year timeframe.  
Our calculations will display three different round-trip scenarios for each of the four 
different routes, where the difference is speed on the fronthaul and backhaul voyage. 
The fronthaul is the first leg of a round-trip that involves transporting goods to a 
targeted destination, whereas the backhaul is the returning journey after delivery. The 
important difference between the fronthaul and the backhaul leg on the Asia - U.S. 
East Coast trade route is the discrepancy in cargo volume traded back and forth. This 
also affects the freight rate, which is almost 50 % lower for the backhaul voyage 
(USEC - Shanghai: 1 530 USD/FEU). Due to the trade discrepancy, we will operate 
with a 40 % load factor on the backhaul19. Note that we have used the Hong Kong 
bunker price for the entire round-trip, i.e. not the New York bunker price for the 
backhaul. This will be a possibility in the model.  
 
First, we will look at the annual results for each route if the speed is 23 - 23, i.e. 23 
knots for the entire round-trip. Secondly, we look at the results if the vessel sails at a 
speed of 23 knots on the fronthaul journey while slow-steaming at a speed of 18 knots 
on the backhaul. Finally, we look at a scenario where the vessel sails at a slow-steam 
pace of 18 knots the entire round-trip.  
In Table 16 we display the results from an example of a round-trip for the Hong Kong 
- New York voyage using the old tariffs for the Panama Canal. 
                                                
19 This is the load factor Stopford (2009) operates with in his examples. 
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Table 16: Post-Panamax round-trip with current Panama Canal tolls 
At a higher speed, the vessel is able to average more round-trip voyages per year and 
generate higher annual revenue. However, with the current fuel prices, the cost of 
sailing at a higher speed exceeds the additional revenue gained by spending less time 
at sea on each voyage. This leads to a preference for slow-steaming. In the previous 
chapter, we suggested that the Panama Canal tariffs per TEU capacity should be 
lower for larger vessels after the expansion. This example verifies this 
recommendation. The high cost of transiting the Panama Canal makes both the Suez 
Canal route and the Route around Good Hope more attractive alternatives when 
accounting for the backhaul instead of just a single voyage.  
 
If we look at an example with a Panamax vessel, presented in Table 17, we see that 
the pricing of the Panama Canal transit is more competitive. 
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Table 17: Panamax round-trip with current Panama Canal tolls 
Even if the route through the Suez Canal and the route around Good Hope generate 
more earnings, we see that the Panama Canal tolls are at a competitive level. As the 
canal tariffs are scaled for smaller vessels like the Panamax, there might be other 
factors influencing the results, such as the bunker price.  
 
In a scenario where the Panama Canal tolls are lowered to match the cost per TEU 
with cost of sailing the Suez Canal route, we would get the following results: 
  73 
   
 
Table 18: Post-Panamax round-trip with adjusted Panama Canal tolls 
With the 28 % change in tariffs, the Panama Canal route generates almost the same 
amount of total earnings as the route through the Suez Canal and the Good Hope, and 
is able to remain competitive. Due to the low bunker prices, the Good Hope route 
presents a competitive alternative to the canal routes.  
 
When comparing the MSC Paloma with the Majestic Maersk on the alternative routes, 
we find that the Majestic Maersk is able to generate almost twice the total earnings at 
18 knots sailing the Suez Canal or the Good Hope. This confirms the results from 
Chapter 7.2.2, which indicates a strong competition from the ULCV segment. 
However, it is fair to assume that the Majestic Maersk in reality, would need to spend 
more time in port due to a larger demand for supply of containers to reach its 
necessary capacity.  
 
When running the Shanghai – New York round-trip for the MSC Paloma on all routes 
without adjusting for new canal tolls, we confirm our previous results on this voyage 
– the Panama Canal is the most profitable alternative on this voyage. However, when 
comparing with the Majestic Maersk on the other routes we see that the Panama 
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Canal is the least preferred alternative – with the Majestic Maersk on the Suez Canal 
route able to generate earnings more than 40 % higher than the MSC Paloma on 
Panama Canal route.  
7.5  Bunker price and Freight rates 
Freight rates and bunker prices are expected to have a great influence on a shipowners 
decisions when choosing which route to sail. If the bunker prices are high, the 
shipowner have to expect higher fuel costs and will therefore prefer to sail shorter 
distances. If the freight rate is low, the gross revenue will be lower, and the shipowner 
will be forced to cut costs by for example sailing at a lower speed. The low freight 
rate could indicate that there is an oversupply of vessels in the market, which would 
make slow-steaming a preference to be able to have more ships operative at the same 
time. If the bunker price were low, the shipowners would be less worried about costs, 
which would favor the longer routes such as the Good Hope route. Lastly, if freight 
rates increase, the shipowner would want to increase profits by sailing shorter routes 
to be able to average a higher amount of voyages per year.  
 
By looking at the sensitivity of bunker prices, we can find the bunker price where the 
preference for one route changes to another. The following sensitivity analysis does 
not take into account a possible correlation between bunker price and freight rate, i.e. 
the freight rate is held constant. In addition, this is built on the previous scenario 
where the Panama Canal tariffs have been decreased by approximately 28 % to match 
the competition from the Suez Canal for larger vessels on the Hong Kong - New York 
voyage with the MSC Paloma. Note that the results are based on a single-voyage 
scenario.  
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Figure 15: Bunker sensitivity 
From Figure 15 we see that when the bunker price goes below $ 600 the Suez Canal 
becomes the preferred route alternative. This is obvious, since the tariff was decreased 
to match the Suez Canal at a bunker of $ 600.50. A more interesting observation is 
that if the bunker price goes below $ 500 it becomes less expensive to sail the Good 
Hope route. This confirms the assumption that if the bunker gets low enough, the 
longer routes will become more attractive.  
 
On the other hand, if we look at the sensitivity for the freight rate, we see that this is 
much less sensitive to changes given that the bunker price is held constant:  
 
 
Figure 16: Freight rate sensitivity 
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8 Discussions 
Dr. Theo Notteboom and Dr. Jean-Paul Rodrigue (2011b) argue that global freight 
distribution, supply chain management, and the strategies for maritime shipping 
companies and terminal operators have become so complex and interrelated that the 
effects of the expansion and the consequences are unclear for most of the parties 
involved. Academics find it difficult to assess the potential impacts, as the possible 
consequences are multidimensional and prone to feedback effects20 (ibid.). As the 
world shipping market still adjusts after the financial crisis in 2008, the expansion 
comes at an interesting point in time. There are still uncertainties regarding main trade 
drivers, such as import-based U.S. consumption, and new trade relations are emerging 
as the rise in Chinese labor costs force companies to shift their production to other 
countries such as Bangladesh and Vietnam (Financial Times, 2011). China´s 
comparative advantage is eroding because of the redistribution of parts of the 
manufacturing to South and Southeast Asia (Notteboom & Rodrigue, 2011b). The re-
location of manufacturing could be both positive and negative for the Panama Canal, 
depending on the new locations. While Bangladesh is located closer to the Suez 
Canal, Taiwan would favor sailing through the Panama Canal. However, it is 
expected that countries closer to the Suez Canal are preferred, mostly due to a 
relatively low income per-capita in countries like Bangladesh, Burma and Cambodia. 
This could be advantageous for the Suez Canal, as larger parts of trade would move 
closer to the Canal. 
For overall world trade, the new Panama Canal will have a positive impact, as the 
capacity for the well-travelled route increases. The expansion will reduce per-unit 
shipping costs for vessels transiting the Canal and calling U.S. ports (Notteboom & 
Rodrigue, 2011b). According to a presentation given by DNB Markets on the 
widening of the Panama Canal (2014) there are uncertainties about who is going to be 
the main beneficiary from the expanded Panama Canal. If the impact is more tradable 
volume and increased traffic in the Canal, both the ACP and shipowners should be 
able to capture more profit. On the contrary, if the existing trade gets re-routed with 
no increase in volume, it is difficult to see who will profit.  
                                                
20Feedback! effects:! The! market! adjusts! to! changes/feedback! in! order! to! establish! a! new!equilibrium! 
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As the Panama Canal offers a unique route in an important trade lane, it is fair to 
assume that the ACP will reap benefits no matter how trade develops. If the container 
shipping industry ends up using shorter routes with no increase in volume, the 
consequence might be that another link in the supply chain or the consumers reaps the 
benefit. This could in turn make the container segment less profitable, which could 
affect the Panama Canal as their largest customer’s solvency decreases.  
8.1  Trade lane effects 
As supply chains have become more sensitive to demand and disruptions, the 
expansion of the Panama Canal gives incentives for companies to explore using Gulf 
Coast ports on the Asia - U.S. trade (Inbound Logistics, 2013). In addition, single-
source strategies on exclusive East and West Coast ports are less common (ibid.). A 
possible effect could be that companies would want to pull products closer to demand 
centers and reduce overland drays.   
The U.S. Southeast is one of the fastest growing population areas in the country, 
situated within rail reach to Ohio Valley and the population center in the U.S. (ibid.). 
Rob O`Brian, president of the Joplin Mo Chamber of Commerce, argues that 
shipowners might change shipping patterns towards Gulf Coast ports and their rail 
connections. By doing so, they could better reach the U.S. inlands. Consequently, the 
West Coast ports perceive the expansion as a threat to their market share in the 
Midwest (Notteboom & Rodrigue, 2011b). This is in line with the arguments that all-
water routes would better serve the mid-inlands of the U.S. after the expansion. If the 
shift of ports materializes, the Panama Canal would have an advantage by bearing 
shorter routes when serving the Gulf ports, and could possibly capture market shares 
from both the Suez Canal and the U.S. Intermodal System. 
New trade patterns might become a self-fulfilling prophecy, as ports in both North 
and South America have started extensive work to accommodate Post-Panamax 
vessels. In order for these projects not to fail, stakeholders will most likely try to 
influence shipowners to choose routes that involve their port facilities. Shipowners 
would probably want to use the new port facilities, as these are expected to be better 
equipped (which could lead to shorter berth time) and have better access (which 
would limit the need for tugs).  
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A major concern, and a possible game changer in regards of new trade patterns, is the 
possibility for backhaul cargo transfer, or lack of such. The imbalance in cargo flows 
makes it difficult for shipowners to make good use of the return trip when sailing the 
Asia - U.S. trade route. If flows were more even, the cost of shipping to the East 
Coast would be lower, as more income could be captured on the return trip. The 
predicted increase in large-scale advantages that comes from the expansion will also 
apply on the return trip. The possibility for a new trade triangle is therefore 
interesting: Consumer goods from Asia to the East Coast, high-end consumer goods 
and pharmaceuticals from North America to South America, and coal and iron ore 
from Columbia, Venezuela and Brazil to China (Forbes, 2013). Exporting liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) to Asia could also become a part of this trade triangle in the future. 
Involving these Latin American countries would also favor Panama over Suez, as they 
are situated in close proximity to Panama. All these possibilities do not necessary 
involve container cargo today, but are used as an example of new trade possibilities21.  
 
Our research has focused on the Panama Canal and the Suez Canal as competitors. 
However, after the expansion, a relative capacity parity exists for the first time 
between the two canals (Rodrigue, 2010). Container shipping companies may use this 
new cohesion as a basis for establishing round-the-world equatorial routes in both 
directions – using container vessels close to the limit of 13 200 TEU. These round-
the-world routes were in fact abandoned by shipping lines in the mid-1990 because of 
the size restrictions in the Panama Canal (Notteboom & Rodrigue, 2011a). This high 
frequency travel route could support a significant share of global East-West freight in 
a cost effective matter. Several round-the-world configurations are possibly 
depending on what marked each carrier serves. This service would not necessary be 
homogeneous as several port-calls are possible, especially if the liner service adds 
some nautical deviations to the route (Rodrigue, 2010). 
8.2  Pricing effects 
Canal pricing has been an issue in the past and, as we have illustrated in our analysis, 
will still be an issue when shipowners choose routes. Nothing official has been 
announced from the ACP about what changes they will make to the transit booking 
                                                
21 Grieg Star is experiencing an increase in cargo moved from bulk to containers in a 
measure to simplify on- and offloading.  
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system when the expanded Panama Canal opens. They are, however, in close dialogue 
with The World Shipping Council and The International Chamber of Shipping 
regarding the possible changes in toll structure and procedures for the expanded canal. 
The general understanding is that the current system, procedures and pricing for 
vessels using the old locks will stay the same, while changes are expected for the new 
locks.  
In a presentation given by the CEO of ACP, Jorge L. Quijano, during an 
INTERCARGO meeting in London on February 7th 2013, long term forecasts and 
new toll structures were discussed. The ACP wants to use the new toll structure to 
facilitate economies of scale for large vessels using the new locks, while maintaining 
and improving the benefits for those using the existing locks. They will also address 
economies of scale in both fully and partially loaded vessels taking draft restricted 
conditions into account, and further recognize the role of ballast transits in some 
trades. They argue that this would move the Canal closer to industry standard ($/Ton), 
encourage traffic volume growth and create greater cost/price transparency. They 
have, amongst other, suggested the following changes: 
 ; Changing from PC/UMS to DWT to measure vessels for toll assessment and 
include a variable portion on actual cargo being carried ; Differentiate different commodity types – grains, coal, iron ore, other dry 
bulks and ballast. By doing this, they will relate tolls to the cargo value in 
order to provide more competitive pricing. This would also mean an 
introduction of specific cargo loading options such as topping-off after 
transiting the Canal ; Having one part of the variable cost depend on fuel prices. This would lead to 
higher transit costs when the fuel price rises, and lower transit costs when the 
fuel price is low. 
 
Rob Lomas, Secretary General at Intercargo, has confirmed to Grieg Star that existing 
Panamax vessels will keep using the old locks after the expansion, with the new locks 
reserved for the larger Post-Panamax vessels. Exceptions will be made when the ACP 
decides otherwise for operational reasons.  The ACP has confirmed that there will be 
no financial disadvantage for the shipowners in this arrangement.  
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The ACP raised the price per TEU capacity from $ 40 in 2006 to $ 72 in 2009, an 80 
percent increase in just three years (Notteboom & Rodrigue, 2011b). The toll is $ 74 
per TEU capacity today, having seemingly stabilized since 2009. It has been said that 
the toll increase already has captured 40 percent of the potential cost savings from the 
expansion, which in turn has mitigated a significant share of the expected gains 
(ibid.). This could further implicate that the price for transiting the new locks will not 
be significantly higher than the current price.  
The Suez Canal transit fees are also under pressure from shipowners. In 2009 several 
shipowners started boycotting the Suez Canal as a reaction to the high transit fees. 
Maersk Line and the Grand Alliance are examples of companies that re-routed many 
of their vessels around the Cape of Good Hope. After this incident, the SCA imposed 
a transit fee freeze as a result of global downturn and an increase in piracy activity. 
The fees have, however, increased since 2009. The transit rates saw an increase of 3 
percent in 2012, 3 to 5 percent in 2013 and the SCA has announced an increase of 
between 2 - 2.6 percent come 1th of May 2014 (The Lone Star, 2014). The raise in 
2013 started a debate on the subject, as freight rates were low and bunker prices high, 
making the increase harder to accept.  
Canal rates are a sensitive issue for shipowners, and both the Panama Canal and the 
Suez Canal show signs of taking customers into account when deciding their prices. 
They also pursue the possibility of increased profits in all segments. What is certain is 
that the two canals will have to take each other’s pricing into account when reviewing 
own rates, as they are the main competitors on the Asia - North America trade route. 
Higher rates, increased popularity towards extra-slow steaming and excess vessel 
supply combined with an uncertain macroeconomic environment may increase the 
popularity of the Cape of Good Hope route. Opting for a longer route may also be a 
mean to counter the excess supply, as sailing longer routes will increase the need for 
vessels. Regardless of route, slow steaming can add three to seven days in transit 
time, which will require the addition of two to three vessels to the pendulum service 
to maintain the frequency of port calls (Notteboom & Rodrigue, 2011b). Lower 
bunker prices would also make shipowners less concerned about nautical miles, 
putting pressure on the canals by making the Good Hope route more affordable.  
 
A substantial risk to the Panama Canal is that the Suez Canal Authorities may use the 
improvement of East Coast ports to their advantage. To meet the new competition the 
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SCA could possibly offer a discount to shipowners in the period after the completion 
of the new locks. By making it more profitable to sail the Suez route, they could 
hinder the establishment of new trade lanes. It is reasonable to assume that the ACP 
has to meet several obligations after the $ 5 billion expansion, making them less able 
to compete on price. Today, the SCA has an arrangement where they grant rebates if 
shipowners are able to prove that their voyage cost through the Suez Canal is more 
expensive than proceeding through an alternative route (Notteboom & Rodrigue, 
2011a). In such a scenario the SCA could take advantage of the expanded port 
facilities by being the preferred option for the largest container vessels on long-haul 
routes to North America.  
8.3  The P3 Alliance 
An emerging deal that could affect the Panama Canal and its position is the proposed 
P3 Alliance between Maersk Line, MSC and CMA CGM. Already approved by U.S. 
regulators, they now await green light from the European Commission and Chinese 
regulators, hoping to start in mid-2014 (Reuters, 2014). Representing the three largest 
container carriers in the world, an alliance could have implications for the canal 
authorities. On the ACP customer-ranking (2014e) MSC is ranked as number two, 
Maersk Line as number five and CMA CGM as number eight – clearly important 
customers to the Panama Canal. Having suffered from excess capacity since the 
financial crisis, the alliance is a measure taken to control the capacity and rates on 
container routes between Asia, North America and Europe. In order to cut costs they 
have agreed to pool approximately 250 vessels on three trade lanes: Asia - Europe, 
trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic. This will allow for the companies to sail bigger and 
more fuel-efficient ships with a higher load factor. Analysts from the investment bank 
Alm forecasts that Maersk would be able to cut costs by 6 percent if the alliance is 
approved (Reuters, 2014).  Both cargo owners and shippers criticize the proposed 
alliance. They fear the alliance will dominate the key routes in a way that could drive 
prices up and push smaller carriers out of the market.   
A reason why this alliance should be monitored is the fact that they have vessels 
available that might force them to exclude the Panama Canal. The alliance is based on 
adjusting demand and supply to allow freight rates to cover their costs, and it is fair to 
assume that sailing the largest ships with a higher load factor could contribute in 
achieving this. This could make Suez a preferred option when sailing the Asia - North 
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America trade route. One option for the ACP is to compensate for the stated 6 percent 
cost reduction by reducing the cost of transit if such a situation should arise. Another 
possibility is a proactive approach touting the alliance as to what is a bearable price 
and practice. This would be a more sensible market approach. It is also possible that 
the container segment is large enough to cover the capacity in the Panama Canal even 
with the alliance favoring the Suez Canal.  
 
The shipping industry is experiencing a surplus of Panamax vessels, which is likely to 
become larger after the new locks open in 2015 (Drewry CIW, 2014). When the new 
locks open it is assumed that more Panamax vessels becomes redundant as 
shipowners upgrades to larger vessels. Given the availability of Panamax vessels, the 
demand for the old locks should still be met, even if the alliance re-routes ships to the 
Suez Canal. The average age of the Panamax fleet is 8.5 years and 73 percent of the 
fleet is under 11 years, making scrapping unlikely. As Panamax vessels usually are 
depreciated over more than 20 years, their book value will be of such size that 
destruction will mean a big shareholder loss and is therefore improbable. A possible 
scenario is that the ACP allows Panamax vessels to transit through the new locks in 
the event of high demand for transiting vessels of Panamax size.  
8.4  Orderbook implications 
The container-shipping segment is characterized by economies of scale, which has led 
to a relentless upsizing of vessels. An overview of the container ship orderbook for 
the last seven years is presented in Figure 17.  
 
 
Figure 17: Orderbook trend 2007-2013 (Clarkson SIN, 2014) 
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After the expansion proposal was announced and passed in 2006, the orderbook for 
container vessels has seen a significant change. Container vessels with a capacity of 
less than 3 000 TEU and vessels ranging from 3 000 to 8 000 TEU have had a 
constant decline in orders since 2007. This decrease might not be solely explained by 
the plans to expand the Panama Canal, but it is fair to assume that the plans have 
made it easier to justify investing in larger container vessels. The increased flexibility 
and re-sale value of vessels up to 13 200 TEU should make the increasing need for 
financing easier to obtain. Today there are twenty-five 18 000 TEU vessels on order 
with planned delivery in 2015 (Clarkson SIN, 2014). Alphaliner (2014) forecasts that 
the total TEU capacity of vessels outsizing the expanded Panama Canal will account 
for approximately 11 percent of the total TEU capacity of the container world fleet by 
the end of 2015. 
Another effect of the expansion might be an overall decrease in demand for vessels, 
regardless of size. When bigger vessels are able to make shorter trips, shipowners and 
shippers will ultimately be able to move more cargo on each voyage. It is thinkable 
that this could lead to a decrease in demand for vessels in the long run. A 
consequence could be a smaller world container fleet containing larger vessels that 
operates the market. Further, this could lead to an extensive turn-around for container 
shipping, as shipowners has to adjust the supply of vessels. A period of low freight 
rates would be inevitable, unless shareholders accept losses in order to scrap unused 
vessels. Based on this hypothesis, it is fair to assume that the effects of the Panama 
expansion not necessarily only have positive implications for shipowners.  
8.5  The U.S. Intermodal System 
Early analysis revealed that the cost of using intermodal container freight from Asia 
to New York was too high compared to the other routes. This was an expected result, 
as intermodal freight in the U.S. involves more parties than the other options. The 
other routes only differ in costs by either using more fuel or transiting a canal, 
whereas the cost of intermodal through the United States is more complex, making in 
very difficult to compare to the all-water routes to New York. Numerous rail and 
truck companies are involved in order to move cargo from west to east and these 
parties derive more costs and risk. Intermodal risk stems from e.g. delays caused by 
harsh weather, congestion, maintenance, and labor conflicts. Even if the intermodal 
alternative was dropped from the cost analysis due to its complexity, this routing 
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option is highly relevant for the Panama Canal. Goods originated outside the U.S. 
with endpoint inlands will have to use intermodal transport when arriving to the U.S. 
coastline. From the ACP expansion proposal (2006) we know that the ACP considers 
this mode as a complementary option, while Stopford (2009) on the other hand argues 
that they are competitors.  
 
The time factor still favors the West Coast intermodal mode when the final 
destination is U.S. inlands. This water-land bridge connects Shanghai with Chicago in 
18 to 20 days. The same route could take up to four weeks choosing an all-water way 
(Inbound Logistics, 2013). Despite the difference in time, shipowners are still opting 
for slow steaming and an all-water way. Offering less risk and a better sustainability, 
supply chains have adopted better up- and down-stream visibility in order to manage 
longer lead times.  
8.6  Environmental effects 
One of the possible effects of the expansion may be the reduction of carbon footprint 
in shipping. In their article, Stott and Wright (2012) refer to the International 
Maritime Organization´s (IMO) predictions that shipping will be responsible for 
between 12 and 18 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions by 2050 unless the 
industry improves significantly. Further, they refer to figures from Clarkson, and 
estimates that bunkers accounted for 28 percent of the daily voyage cost in the 1990s, 
compared to 78 percent in January 2012. However, the bunker prices have decreased 
in proportion to total costs in 2014, as prices are lower than the high levels of early 
2012. Sailing larger vessels leads to a smaller CO2 footprint per container or per 
metric cargo ton. In addition, newer vessels are assumed to be more fuel-efficient. 
This could be an important factor for both shipowners and shippers, and adds to the 
series of incentives to upsize container vessels. If we only look at CO2 emissions, an 
18 000 TEU vessel should be preferred to a 13 200 TEU vessel, and thereby favor the 
Suez route. However, a shorter route through the Panama Canal should lead to less 
pollution.  
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9  Concluding remarks 
From our pre-expansion analysis we have found that the Panama Canal provides a 
competitive alternative in the Panamax segment. However, we also found that by 
exploiting economies of scale, shipowners are able to lower their voyage costs 
significantly. The cost per TEU and the size of vessels can be considered inversely 
proportional. This has played in favor of the alternative routes such as the Suez Canal 
and the Cape of Good Hope, where larger vessels require a much lower load factor to 
stay competitive with the current Panama Canal.  
 
The post-expansion analysis uncovered a discrepancy between the current Panama 
Canal tariffs and sailing time on the Hong Kong - New York voyage when sailing 
with a Post-Panamax vessel. With the current tariff based on cost per TEU capacity, 
the new Panama Canal will not be able to stay competitive and shipowners may 
continue to use alterative routes for their Post-Panamax vessels. It will be decisive 
that the new toll system facilitates for economies of scale by lowering the cost per 
TEU capacity transited through the Panama Canal. The ACP has proposed several 
solutions for the new toll structure, and we think that a good option would be to have 
a diminishing cost per TEU capacity transited. This would make the Panama Canal 
competitive with the Suez Canal that has based their tolls on diminishing cost per 
tonne. In addition, a solution would be to link the tariff to the bunker price. By 
lowering the cost of transit proportionally with the bunker price, the Panama Canal 
would be able to stay competitive with the longer routes that are more relevant when 
bunker prices are low. If this solution were to be introduced, a ceiling would be 
recommended to avoid the cost of transit becoming too high if the bunker price 
increases.  
 
The round-trip scenarios strengthen the findings from the initial analysis. An 
interesting observation is that at the current freight rate and bunker price, our results 
suggests that slow-steaming is the best alternative to maintain profits. This coincides 
with the current situation, where vessels are slow-steaming due to an imbalance in 
supply and demand. Our bunker price and freight rate analysis shows that bunker 
prices are more sensitive than freight rates. A higher bunker price will increase the 
willingness to pay for transiting the canals to avoid longer sailing distances. Further, 
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we found that the difference in sailing time between the Panama Canal, the Suez 
Canal and the Cape of Good Hope route is close to irrelevant in today’s market. This 
indicates that there are no annual gains from sailing a shorter route at a higher speed 
given the current bunker price. Consequently, there are incentives for shipowners to 
prioritize cutting costs at the expense of fewer annual round-trips.  
 
We believe that the expansion of the Panama Canal will have a positive effect on the 
world trade. However, it is difficult to predict the effect on container shipping. If the 
expansion leads to an increase in tradable volume, this should have a positive effect 
for container shipping. But if the expansion only leads to a shift for existing trade, the 
increase in cargo shipped by fewer ships on the shorter route through the Panama 
Canal could have a negative effect for shipowners.   
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Appendix 1 – Model guide 
 
This is a guide developed to help users of the model. The results displayed in the 
model are described in Chapter 5, Model description. An explanation to the data used 
in the model can be found in Chapter 6, Data. The model is found in a CD attached 
with the document.  
 
1. Opening the model 
 
When opening the excel-file, it is important that macros are activated. You will be 
asked if you want to disable macros before opening the file.  
 
Click Enable macros. 
 
2. Front page 
 
The front page displays two options for the model:  
 
• Single Voyage Cost Comparison 
• Round-Trip Calculation  
 
Choose the preferred alternative by clicking one of the options.  
 
Based on your choice you will be sent to one of the following pages: 
 
3. Single Voyage Cost Comparison 
 
This model gives you the possibility to calculate the cost and results for four specific 
voyages or route alternatives and compare the results.  
 
3.1. Input values 
 
The cells marked in red are the input cells. This is where you can choose your input 
values for the calculation. 
 
3.1.1. Additional information: 
 
Freight rate per FEU is equipped with an explanation box. The freight rate for the 
model calculations needs to be in $/FEU. Freight rates on the routes between Asia and 
the U.S. are usually provided in $/FEU but if the freight rate is found in $/TEU, this 
must be converted by multiplying the $/TEU by 2.  
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Route is equipped with a scroll-down menu where you are presented with the 
available route alternatives to choose from.  
 
For more information about each Route you can go to the table where all the data is 
stored. The table can be found in the sheet named Route information. 
  
Name is equipped with a scroll-down menu where you are presented with the 
available vessel name alternatives to choose from.  
 
For more information about each Name (i.e. vessel information) you can go to the 
tables where all the data are stored. The tables can be found in the sheets named 
Panamax Container Register or Post-Panamax Container Register, depending on 
which ship category you want to compare.  
 
Note that the name list is directly linked to the ship category. When you change the 
ship category from e.g. Panamax to PostPanamax, the vessel name will not 
automatically change and the model will not be able to calculate and all calculations 
will display N/A (Not available). Therefore, you need to change the name of the 
vessel after changing ship category for the model to calculate.  
 
Operating speed is equipped with a scroll-down menu where you are presented with 
the available speed alternatives to choose from.  
 
Note that the model only allow for integer values between 18 - 25 knots. It is also 
important to notice that the design speed of the vessel is mentioned under 2. Ship 
information in the calculation sheet.  
 
If the operating speed chosen is higher that the design speed of the vessel, the model 
will not calculate fuel costs. In this case, the cost per TEU result will display as not 
available. 
 
The input cells without a scroll-down menu are equipped with a short explanation box 
that provides information regarding value restrictions.  
 
3.2. Calculation 
 
The model will calculate the costs and results automatically when input values are 
inserted in the input cells.  
 
3.3. Export of results and sensitivity analysis 
 
The model provides the possibility to export the results to a new workbook or run 
sensitivity analysis for key components. These options are presented on the right side 
of the calculations. For sensitivity analysis, click the preferred sensitivity option, and 
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the model will calculate the scenario automatically and export the results to a new 
workbook.  
 
4. Round-Trip Calculation 
 
This model gives you the possibility to calculate a round-trip voyage. It will also 
calculate the annual result for the chosen round-trip.  
 
4.1. Input values 
 
The cells marked in red are the input cells. This is where you can choose your input 
values for the calculation. The design is similar to the single voyage cost comparison 
model. However, this model only calculates for one voyage. It distinguish between 
the fronthaul and backhaul leg of the voyage, i.e. the back and forth journey of the 
trip.  
 
Note that the fuel unit cost, freight rate and load factor usually are different for the 
backhaul journey in the round-trip. 
 
4.1.1. Additional information 
 
This is similar to the information presented under additional information for the single 
voyage cost comparison model. 
 
4.2. Calculation 
 
The model will calculate the costs and results automatically when input values are 
inserted in the input cells.  
 
4.3. Export of results 
 
The model provides the possibility to export the results to a new workbook. This 
option is presented on the right side of the calculations. 
 
5. Other important information 
 
5.1. Hidden sheets and calculations  
 
Some of the calculation sheets are hidden. To show them, right click on one of the 
sheets in the bottom navigation line and click Unhide. 
 
In addition some of the results for the sensitivity analyses are calculated in the 
calculation sheet before they are exported to a new workbook. These calculations are 
hidden below the main calculations. 
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5.2. Navigation 
 
Each calculation sheet is equipped with a Back-button, which will take you back to 
the front page. 
 
When exporting the results or performing sensitivity analysis, the results are 
displayed in a new worksheet that automatically opens. For Mac-users this workbook 
opens in a new window. For Windows-users this workbook may open in the same 
window. To get back to the main workbook, the other workbook may have to be 
minimized depending on your default settings.  
 
5.3. Data tables 
 
All the information used for calculating the costs and results in the model are 
available in separate sheets in the Excel-workbook. If you want to view the 
information presented in these sheets, the easiest way to navigate between them is to 
use the navigation line on the bottom of the page.  
 
5.4. Locked workbook and cells 
 
The entire workbook will be locked for structural changes. In addition, all sheets 
except the calculation sheets will be locked for editing. The locked sheets are not 
restricted by password, and can be unlocked if the user wish to make changes.  
 
Cells that perform calculations will not be locked for editing because some of the 
sensitivity calculations depend on the calculation sheet to be unlocked. It is not 
recommended to edit these cells, as they depend on intricate formulas calculated in 
other, hidden sheets.  
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Appendix 2 – Port settlement 
 
 
 
Estimates for a Houston Port settlement for a Grieg Star vessel*: 
 
Port Dues (per day)  $ 5 000 
Pilot    $ 7 500 
Towage   $ 8 200 
Lines    $ 1 000 
Agency Charges  $ 8 500 
 
* These are rough estimates for one of their largest vessels. The costs will vary with 
the size of the vessel. Handling costs will come in addition.   
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Appendix 3 – Invoice Panama Canal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
